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ABSTRACT
Consumers search before making virtually any purchase. The notion that consumers engage
in costly search is well-understood to have deep implications for market performance. However
to date, no theoretical model allows for the observation that consumers often purchase more than
a single product in an individual shopping occasion. Clothing, food, books, and music are but
four important examples of goods that are purchased many items at a time. I develop a modeling
approach that accounts for multi-purchase occasions in a structural way. My model shows that
as preference for variety increases, so does the size of the consideration set. Search models that
ignore preference for variety are, therefore, likely to under-predict the number of products searched.
It is generally thought that lower search costs increase retail competition which pushes prices and
assortments down. However, I show that there is an optimal number of products to o¤er depending
on the intensity of consumer search costs. Consumers with high search costs prefer to shop at a
store with a large assortment of goods and purchase multiple products, even if the prices that rm
charges is higher than competing rmsprices. On the other hand, consumers with low search costs
tend to purchase fewer goods and shop at the stores that have lower prices, as long as the store has a
reasonable assortment o¤ering. The implications for market performance are dramatic and pervasive.
In particular, the misspecication of demand model in which search is important and/or multiple
discreteness is observed will produce biased parameter estimates leading to erroneous managerial
conclusions.
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PREFACE
This dissertation is a three-paper dissertation. However, each paper deals with the subject
of better understanding and modeling consumer demand in a multi product purchase environment.
Chapters 1 and 5 provide a general introduction and conclusion applicable to all three papers.
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are largely self contained and independent from one another in terms of
symbols and equations.
Enjoy!
ix
CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
"In confusion there is prot" - Tony Curtis
Consumers regularly purchase multiple products on the same shopping trip, and incur some
kind of cost when searching for their ideal product mix. For example, consumers regularly buy
many pair of jeans, brands of cereal or bottles of wine on each trip to the store, and typically
consider each purchase carefully. Despite the importance of consumer search in such multi-purchase
situations, there is very little research that examines the theoretical and empirical implications.
From a theoretical perspective, search is both more di¢ cult if many products are considered on each
trip, but less costly if some of the cost of search is xed. How multi-product purchases a¤ect search
intensity, therefore, is an open question a question that is at once interesting and important. As
a subject of inquiry, search spans the elds of macroeconomics, labor, marketing, public nance,
and industrial organization, among others, and touches the most important issues of the day 
unemployment, ination, the reach of technology, and market competitiveness. Empirically, multi-
product purchase complicates analysis because commonly-used models are no longer valid. For
example, it is well understood that applying discrete choice models such as the logit or probit to
product categories in which multiple purchases are common produces incorrect estimates of the
marginal e¤ect of marketing mix elements (Dubé 2004). By extension, new models of consumer
demand are necessary to study the econometrics of search. In this dissertation, I provide a better
understanding of consumer demand when multiple products are regularly considered for purchase
and consumers actively search to resolve uncertainty over product attributes.
Recognizing that consumers actively search for products within limited consideration sets
changes the way I model demand in a fundamental way.1 Existing models of demand assume con-
sumers are aware of all alternatives, and search among them costlessly. Logically, this cannot be
true, and the implications of costly search and limited consideration sets are dramatic. Koulayev
(2010), for example, shows that a failure to account for endogenous and limited consideration sets
leads to signicant over-estimation of price elasticities. Similarly, Seiler (2011) and Pires (2012) use
1For a more comprehensive review of the e¤ect consumer search has on demand see Ratchford
(2009).
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dynamic structural models of consumer demand that account for the cost of search to explain the
important role played by putting items on feature or display. If the cost of search is greater than the
benet of nding a lower price, then rational retailers will put items on feature or display to lower
the cost of search, and make price promotions more e¤ective. Insights like this are only revealed by
explicitly considering consumer search behavior.
Search has also gained prominence with the growth of online shopping. Indeed, the ubiquity
of online search, and questions regarding marketing performance in a world of "costless" search
has raised the prole of consumer search as an economic activity. While it was once thought that
the ability to search for goods online would increase market competitiveness and do away with
price dispersion, Brynjol¤son and Smith (2000), Clay, Krishnan and Wolf (2001), and Chevalier and
Goolsbee (2003) report signicant price dispersion between online vendors, even in homogeneous
product categories such as textbooks and music CDs. More recently, Hong and Shum (2006), Kim,
Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2010), and de los Santos, Hortacsu, and Wildenbeest (2012) develop
more formal models of search behavior and conrm that search costs are still signicant, even in
the most e¢ cient of channels. What this research reveals is remarkable the ability to shop more
e¢ ciently allows consumers to focus on nding products that meet their exact specications in
di¤erentiated product categories (Anderson and Renault 1999; Chen and Hitt 2003; Kuksov 2004;
and Cachon, Terwiesch, and Xu 2008), making demand for online goods less elastic as consumers
demand goods with exact specications. Retail price markups can rise as a result. Yet, despite
the logic of this argument, there is little empirical evidence to support this outcome, and less that
considers the realities of what is still the dominant form of retail purchases: Multiple goods purchased
during an individual shopping trip in traditional, bricks-and-mortar retailers.
In my dissertation, I examine search behavior in brick-and-mortar retail markets to investigate
whether search costs remain signicant in a more general class of purchases, namely goods consumers
shop for, and purchase, many items at a time. Purchases in multi-product environments rarely
adhere to the unit-purchase assumption of standard discrete choice models. Rather, consumers tend
to make multiple-discrete choices, and purchase continuous quantities, and to assume otherwise
invites signicant bias in models designed for purely single item discrete-choice environments (Dubé
2004; and Richards, Gómez, and Pofahl 2012). For example, in the household-panel data used in
2
this study, only 41% of the trips involving ice cream purchases in the U.S. throughout 2007 and
2008 were for a single unit of ice cream.2 In other words, existing consumer demand-search models
are not applicable to 59% of ice cream purchases. Additionally, numerous categories exist in which
purchases are made by weight or volume such as produce or meat, as opposed to a pre-packaged
unit. Standard discrete choice demand, or demand-search models, are simply not applicable to
these situations. While there are several explanations for why consumers make multiple discrete-
continuous purchases, one of the prevailing arguments is that they are driven by a preference for
variety.
There are a number of reasons why multi-unit purchases may reect a demand for variety.
First, consumers prefer variety as they shop in anticipation of several consumption occasions follow-
ing each purchase decision (Dubé 2004). A person that has a particular taste for variety may purchase
several di¤erent avors of yogurt to avoid consuming the same one day after day. When shopping
for clothes, consumers rarely leave the store with only one bag unless they anticipate wearing the
same thing every day. Second, a consumer may purchase for a household with several members,
each of whom prefers a di¤erent avor of ice cream. Because demand theory describes consumption,
but empirical analysis relies on purchase data, both purely discrete or continuous demand models
misrepresent consumer search and purchase behavior (Hendel 1999; and Dubé 2004). Fundamental
to the notion of a preference for variety is that consumers face a diminishing marginal utility across
products. With uncertainty over product attributes, no single choice stands out as a clear favorite a
priori, so utility rises the more choices are available, but at a decreasing rate. Anderson and Renault
(1999) describe this as a "preference for diversity," as consumers want a diverse set of o¤erings in
the hope that the most desirable product can be found (Moorthy, Ratchford, and Talukdar 1997).
Here, I consider the preference for diversity, or variety, as the consumers desire to consider multiple
competing products due to a diminishing marginal utility across the set of products on o¤er.
Recognizing the role diminishing marginal utility plays in shaping a preference for variety,
Bhat (2005, 2008) extends the multiple discrete-continuous demand model of Kim, Allenby, and
Rossi (2002) to derive a generalized logit model that relaxes the unit purchase assumption. In
Chapter 2 I develop a theoretical model that builds on this framework by recognizing consumers
2Calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC.
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incur a search cost when evaluating competing alternatives. This model provides insight into the
relationship between a consumers optimal consideration set and the cost of search in the presence
of a preference for variety. If a consumers preference for variety leads to multiple purchases on the
same trip (Dubé 2004; Bhat 2005, 2008), then the marginal benet of additional search increases,
directly a¤ecting the search strategy. I show that the size of a consumers optimal consideration set
increases with their preference for variety. Single-purchase models that ignore consumerspreference
for variety and the inherent endogeneity of a their consideration sets thus underpredict the size of the
optimal consideration set and the elasticity of demand (Roberts and Lattin, 1991; Mehta, Rajiv, and
Srinivasan 2003; Honka 2010; Koulayev 2010; and Sieler 2011; Honka 2013). My theoretical model,
on the other hand, provides a framework for understanding the e¤ect an individuals preference for
variety has on his optimal consideration set, and subsequent purchase decisions.
One of the drawbacks of other theoretical consumer search models is that they are not
amenable to empirical testing, or managerial application (Ratchford 2009). My theoretical model,
on the other hand, can be extended in a straight forward way to be estimated, and tested, with the
appropriate dataset. In Chapter 3, I develop an empirical model that is grounded in the theory of
multi-product purchase developed in Chapter 2. The structural empirical model is derived from a
single utility-maximizing consumer demand problem in which consumers decide the optimal number
of products to search through based on their expected maximum utility. Consumers then choose
optimal purchase quantities subject to their budget constraint. This model provides estimates of
not only the usual set of demand parameters brand-specic preferences, price-responses, and the
importance of other element of the marketing mix but estimates of the optimal consideration set
size, and its composition based on the magnitude of product specic search costs.
Estimating consideration set size and composition is both novel, and important on a practical
level. Estimates of consideration set sizes, and the extent of each consumerspreference for variety
is managerially useful as retailers must make assortment planning decisions on a weekly basis. For
example, if a particular category has a large number of products on display and yet consumers only
consider a small proportion, managers can reduce costs by o¤ering fewer products. Knowing the
satisfaction consumers obtain from individual products also allows category managers to evaluate
which products consumer prefer, and which can be eliminated from the shelf. I nd that consumers
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search an increasing number of products as their preference for variety increases, without necessarily
increasing the number of products purchased. Understanding the composition of the consideration
set is critically important because the substitution between products in the set di¤ers signicantly
from the substitution between products that are not considered.
Search costs are not observable, so are often ignored. In fact, one of the biggest empirical
challenges to studying consumer search is that search behavior and search costs are unobservable in
both retail and household purchase data (Zwick, Rapoport, Lo, and Muthukrishnan 2003). With
household level purchase data, the researcher observes the products that were purchased and detailed
information about those particular products, but is often unaware of the products the consumer con-
sidered, and which were ignored completely. Even within datasets that do contain explicit records
of consumerssearch behavior the cost of search is still unobserved (de los Santos, Hortacsu, and
Wildenbeest 2012; Honka 2013; and Honka and Chintagunta 2013). In Chapter 4, I use an experi-
mental approach to study the relationship between the number of products presented to a consumer
and their subsequent search and purchase behavior. By imposing a search cost, and a preference for
variety, I induce search behavior in the presence of a preference for variety that leads the participants
to make both single, and multiple-purchase decisions.
My experiment reveals many important insights into consumerssearch behavior as it relates
to both single, and multi-product purchases. In particular, I show that as the size of the consideration
set grows, consumers search less, meaning that they are more apt to purchase, but this e¤ect is
highly non-linear. Beyond a certain point, search expands as consumers become unwilling to choose.
Retailers can increase the assortment available to persuade a consumer to patronize their store and
avoid searching another. However, this does not increase without bound. Eventually, a consumer
will be overwhelmed by the number of products o¤ered and search the other store as well, or possibly
instead. The degree to which consumers are overburdened by the variety o¤ered exhibits signicant
heterogeneity among subjects, perhaps explaining why this "choice overload hypothesis" has had
mixed support. The results of Chapter 4 also illustrate the importance of including variety in future
consumer search studies.
Search is an equilibrium outcome. That is, if consumers search rationally, then retailers
should expect search, and behave accordingly. Stigler (1961) relaxed the notion that consumers
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know the price each retailer is charging and showed how price dispersion can exist. Varian (1980)
builds on this notion further by recognizing that stores rarely keep their prices consistently high
or low all the time (Butters 1977; and Salop and Stiglitz 1977) and showed that an uninformed
market segment will lead to retailers o¤ering temporary price reduction, or sales, in an equilibrium
setting. In addition to price dispersion, search has been used to explain a number of other market
phenomenon. Cachon Terwiesch and Xu (2008) develop an equilibrium model that investigates the
relationship between consumer search and the equilibrium number of products brought to market
by suppliers. They showed that the equilibrium price can increase as consumers search across a
wider range of retailers because increasingly di¤erentiated products will be introduced. Kuksov and
Villas-Boas (2010) extend this idea further by endogenizing not only the number of products o¤ered
in the market, but also the attributes of the products o¤ered. They show that too many products
increased the total cost of search to the point that consumers avoid making a purchase all together.
On the other hand, if too few products are o¤ered then consumers avoid making a purchase because
they fear there is not an acceptable product (Kamenica 2008; and Norwood 2006). Recognizing
that consumers consider a limited number of products has important implications for the number of
products brought to market, and their attributes. Throughout the dissertation, I draw implications
for optimal retailer behavior from my model of multi-product search, and purchase, behavior.
Chapter 6 o¤ers a summary of my theoretical, empirical, and experimental ndings and a
comment on how my ndings generalize beyond the product categories considered here. Because
costly information acquisition is a fundamental to many aspects of an individuals life my results
generalize beyond just multi-product consumer goods. For example, most individuals are unfamil-
iar with the specic coverage di¤erent insurance plans o¤er, and young healthy individuals have
little perceived benet to carefully considering a large number of di¤erent plans. Presenting these
individuals with a large number of (complex) insurance plans may deter them from making a se-
lection at all which could be detrimental to the entire industry as insurance plans rely on young,
healthy members to maintain nancial stability. In this chapter, I also provide suggestions for future
work, and describe in some detail the limitations of adopting my approach to demand analysis in a
multi-product, search environment.
6
CHAPTER 2.
CONSUMER SEARCH AND PRODUCT VARIETY: A THEORETICAL APPROACH
2.1 Introduction
It is well understood that knowledge is valuable and comes at a cost. Consumers, in particular,
typically incur some kind of cost to obtain information in order to resolve a priori uncertainty
regarding prices. Visiting websites, reading ads online or in physical media, or even travelling to
di¤erent stores are all examples. Even for completely undi¤erentiated products, prices will vary
among sellers unless the market is centralized (Stigler 1961). If search for product information were
costless, consumers would consider the price of every identical product and choose the cheapest
one. In which case, all rms would charge the same price, or face no demand. But, uniform prices
are rarely observed, even for homogenous goods (Marvel 1976; Lach, 2002; Baye, Morgan, and
Scholten, 2004; and Caglayan, Filiztekin, and Rauh 2008). Because search costs are not zero, prices
will vary across rms if consumers follow a rational search procedure, comparing prices until the
marginal cost of doing so exceeds the marginal benet. Prices will also vary between rms if: (1)
products are di¤erentiated (Hortacsu and Syverson 2004; Wildenbeest 2011), (2) consumers search
in non-sequential fashion (de los Santos, Hortacsu, and Wildenbeest 2012), or (3) assortments are
endogenous (Anderson and Renault 1999, 2000; Cachon, Terwiesch, and Xu 2008). Search, therefore,
is an inherent feature of nearly every market for products or services. Yet, there are no theoretical
treatments of search relevant to where it is most common: In multi-product environments in which
consumers purchase many products together, and exhibit a preference for variety. This chapter
provides a theoretical examination of search under a preference for variety that is relevant to such
multi-product retail environments.
Search that results in the purchase of a single product implicitly assumes the total cost of
search is absorbed by that one product. Rather, the size of a consumers optimal consideration set
increases with the preference for variety and, in many cases, a consumer will spread search costs over
several purchases, even within the same category. For example, consumers often purchase several
pairs of jeans, or breakfast cereals at the same time, but rarely wear all of them, or eat them at the
same time. If a consumers preference for variety leads to multiple purchases on the same trip, then
the marginal benet of additional search increases, leading to more search (Anderson and Renault
1999).
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Multiple purchases are more common than I expect and, as a result, more important. Pur-
chases in multi-product environments often deviate from the standard logit or probit discrete-choice
assumption (one product is purchased) because consumers tend to make multiple-discrete choices,
and purchase continuous quantities (Dubé 2004; and Richards, Gómez, and Pofahl 2012). For exam-
ple, in 2007 and 2008 consumers purchased single units on only 41% of the trips involving ice cream
purchases.1 Further, in many categories consumers purchase by weight or volume (e.g., produce
or meat), as opposed to a pre-packaged unit so single choice discrete-choice search models are not
appropriate. Such multiple discreteness is thought to be a manifestation of consumerspreference
for variety (Dubé 2004; Bhat 2005, 2008). The fact that consumers have a preference for variety
has been well documented (Borle, Boatwright, Nunes, and Shmueli 2005; Oppewal and Koelemeijer
2005; Richards and Hamilton 2006; Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox 2009). However, research has
also suggests that, in some cases, there can be too much variety and decrease the propensity to
search (Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Chernev 2003; Shah and Wolford 2007; and Mogilner, Rudnick,
and Iyengar 2008). In this chapter, I develop a model of search under a preference for variety that
naturally leads to multiple-discreteness.
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature. I show that as the preference for
variety increases, consideration sets become larger. Therefore, search models that ignore a preference
for variety are likely to under-predict the actual size of the optimal consideration set. My results
o¤er an explanation as to why some consumer search studies nd people search too much (Zwick,
Rapoport, Lo, and Muthukrishnan 2003). As an individuals preference for variety increases, so does
the size of their consideration set. Ignoring preference for variety, therefore, may make it appear as
though consumers search too much, instead of optimally. Like other models of search, I nd that
consideration set-size is inversely related to the cost of search, but directly related to expectations
of the general level of prices. Larger consideration sets, in turn, imply that more of the goods in the
category are direct substitutes. In particular, I show that substitution between goods, and hence
the elasticity of demand, di¤ers signicantly based on which goods are, or are not, included in the
consideration set. Because search costs depend on consumersopportunity costs of time, I also show
that the size of a consumers consideration set falls in their level of income (Mehta, Rajiv, and
1Calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC.
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Srinivasan 2003). My ndings not only point to more useful ways of modeling the cost of search,
but also inform critical retail assortment and pricing decisions.
2.1.1 Background on Consumer Search
Price dispersion, or violations of the law of one price, have long been regarded as somewhat of
a theoretical puzzle. Recognizing that stores rarely keep prices consistently high or low all the time,
Varian (1980) explains "temporal" price dispersion, or "sales," as resulting from the coexistence of
informed and uninformed consumers. His intuition is straight forward rms have to decide whether
to extract surplus from the uninformed consumers, or sell to both informed as well as uninformed
consumers by charging the lowest price. Price dispersion persists, therefore, because consumers do
not search become informed  in his model. Price dispersion instead should be consistent with
the notion that consumers do indeed search, and search optimally, comparing the marginal cost and
benet of searching for another product (Stiger 1961).
Even if consumers search rationally, price dispersion may still exist if products are di¤er-
entiated. In reality, rms o¤er goods that are di¤erentiated in the hopes of meeting consumers
preferences better than their competitors (Chamberlin 1933). Anderson and Renault (1999, 2000)
demonstrate the importance of di¤erentiation to search behavior by incorporating search into a
discrete-choice model of di¤erentiated-product demand. In their model, search is dened over both
price and attributes, and not just price alone. In order to learn the price a particular rm is charging,
and the characteristics of the product, a consumer must pay a search cost and search sequentially
with costless recall. They show that as a consumers preference for variety increases, he searches
more intensively, and equilibrium prices fall. As prices fall, the expected gains from price-search de-
crease and price settles to an equilibrium. Similarly, as the cost of search increases, the equilibrium
price increases and the number of di¤erentiated products decreases. However, Anderson and Renault
(1999, 2000) do not account for the fact that consumers can obtain information on several products
at a time. This simplication is not trivial as multi-product search can change the implications of
the model in fundamental ways (Roberts and Lattin 1991).
The ability to gain information on several products while incurring a single cost of search, or
multi-product search, lies at the core of the retailing function as retailers allow consumers to reduce
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their search costs by evaluating multiple items in a single location (Betancourt 2004).2 Through
retailers, consumers can learn about the attributes of multiple products at the same time while
incurring a single cost of search. Stigler (1961) may have had this perspective in mind in explaining
a "xed sample-size" model of search, or one in which consumers search among a xed set of
products, and choose the one they prefer. This xed-sample size, or non-sequential, search model
predicts only the number of products searched, not their identity, and assumes products are chosen
at random. Seeking a more descriptive alternative, Weitzman (1979) derived a sequential model of
search in which consumers rank-order products according to their desirability and search until they
nd one that meets their needs. A sequential search model describes which products are searched
as well as how many. However, the sequential search model has since come under scrutiny. Diel
and Zauberman (2005) argue that consumers are actually better o¤ when searching from the least
preferred product to the most preferred because there are more positive experiences when going from
one choice to the next. In other words, when search is not too costly, consumers are more likely to
search through products in an increasing order of preference because their overall search experience
will yield better outcomes.
The empirical evidence favors non-sequential search. De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wilden-
beest (2012) test the applicability of the sequential search model against a xed-sample size alter-
native using online search data in which search behavior is directly observed. They nd that the
pricing pattern across stores are not consistent with a sequential search model because higher prices
do not induce a consumer to necessarily engage in more search. While they caution against the
generalizability of their results based on a single category of data (online book sales), their research
lends strong evidence to support the xed-sample size search model. Rather, theoretical models of
consumer search should not simply assume one mode of search, but rather carefully consider the con-
text of the search at hand. Because the context for my model involves consumers searching through
consumer products that are relatively well-understood, I assume a xed-sample size model. Whether
sequential or non-sequential, however, the recent literature is silent on how consumersdemand for
variety should a¤ect search. Because consumers are likely to have some preference for variety across
2Although arguments have been made against this point, for example Hagiu and Jullien (2011).
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books, my research focuses on how consumerspreference for variety shapes their search strategy in
a xed-sample size framework.
2.2 Model of Consumer Search
In this section, I derive a model of optimal consumer search in which the demand for variety
plays a prominent role. Central to the objective of the paper is to understand how heterogenous
preferences for variety a¤ect consumerssearch strategy. In particular, does a high preference for
variety lead consumers to change their search behavior? If so, how do changes in search behavior
a¤ect subsequent purchase behavior? Another key question this research seeks to answer is how does
search behavior change when the cost of search can be spread across a number of di¤erent product
purchases? Currently, the search literature has focused on single purchase models to study search.
In so doing, the total cost of search must be absorbed by a single product purchase. Moreover,
search behavior based on single purchase discrete choice models inherently assume consumers have a
su¢ cient amount of income for both search and purchase and that these two expenses are indepen-
dent of one another. Another goal of the model developed in this research is to explicitly recognize
that total consumer income is xed, and consumers make search decisions knowing the more spent
searching the less they have to spend on product purchases. Allowing consumers to make multiple
discrete/continuous purchases provides a natural framework with which to study such behavior.
Consider an industry comprised of N di¤erentiated goods each sold by a single rm. Let the
global set of products available to a consumer be N = f1; 2; :::; Ng. Given the set of products N,
the consumer can purchase any combination of goods from N in any desirable quantity conditional
only on their income. The consumers total utility is additive over all product quantities. In other
words, a representative consumer from the population has a utility function given by:
U =
X
i
xi; (2.1)
where xi is the utility obtained from product i; and consumers are allowed to purchase 1 to N
products. Consumers purchase multiple products for any of a number of reasons, including product
satiation, household heterogeneity, or a preference for variety (Dubé 2004). As consumers become
satiated with a product, they can gain utility by consuming a di¤erent, albeit equally attractive,
product. Satiation is implied by decreasing marginal returns. The satisfaction obtained from a cold
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beverage on a hot day is high, but will decrease as the second, and third beverages are consumed. The
degree to which consumers become satiated is determined by their preference for variety. Consumers
who quickly become satiated with a product have a higher preference for variety because their
overall utility is increased with the consumption of a wider range of products. Preference for variety,
therefore, naturally leads to multiple product purchases, even if the goods are not intended to be
consumed together.
Consumers often purchase products in varying quantities. For example, grocery shoppers can
purchase deli meat either in pre-weighed containers, or in bulk from the deli counter. Search models
rarely include both the observation that consumers have a preference for variety that drives multiple
product purchases, and continuous quantities. In single-purchase search models, search costs must
be absorbed entirely by the product being purchased. However, when a consumer can spread his
search cost over a number of products, the net benet will be correspondingly higher.
I assume a exible functional form for xi in equation (2.1) following Kim, Allenby, and
Rossi (2002), Bhat (2005), and Satomura, Kim, and Allenby (2011), and dene the total utility an
individual consumer obtains on a particular shopping occasion by:
U =
X
i
ui (e"i (qi + i))
 (2.2)
where qi is the quantity purchased of good i, i is the satiation rate for product i, and  is the
overall preference for variety where i and  are known to the consumer. A larger i represents a
good that provides a higher degree of inherent satisfaction, in the sense that a consumer is satised
with a relatively small amount. The parameter  represents the consumers preference for variety in
that higher values of  suggest a higher marginal utility. The parameters i and  are core to the
model, so I return to their interpretation below. Finally, ui captures product specic characteristics
such as shelf location, package size, or the amount of sugar, or fat in ice cream, for example. As
discussed by Kim, Allenby, and Rossi (2002) and Bhat (2005) the utility function given in (2.2) is
a translated utility function that is valid so long as ui > 0. To ensure that this is the case over all
observations, I dene ui =ei .
Consumer search is dened over individual products. Consumers are assumed to be uncertain
of each products attributes. That is, they do not know the exact value of each, but know the
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distribution of an individual products attributes, including price. The error term, e"i ; represents
consumer uncertainty for product i which is resolved by incurring a search cost ci and obtaining
that products attribute information. The error term is assumed to be independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) Gumbel, or Extreme Value Type 1 (Fréchet 1927; Fisher and Tippett 1928;
Gumbel 1958; and Kotz and Nadarajah 2000). The consumer decides on the consideration set to
search from among all available consideration sets and, once search is completed, eliminates e"i . For
those products that are searched, all product attributes are revealed perfectly. Uncertainty over
product attributes in the utility function a¤ect the utility for individual goods in a fundamental
way. Namely, the error term e"i shifts the consumers perceived utility up or down because it is an
argument of the sub-utility function: (e"i (qi + i))
.
My model recognizes that search is not costless, and consumers must resolve the uncertainty
for product attributes by incurring a search cost ci for the ith product searched. Consumers decide
the composition of the consideration set knowing the distribution of the error, e"i and, once the
consumer incurs the search cost for product i, "i = 0. Because search is dened over products and
attributes, search cost di¤ers for each product. The utility function given in equation (2.2) is a
generalized multiple-discrete version of the standard logit model (Bhat 2005).
I assume a xed-sample search process (de los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest 2012).
Following Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan (2003), consumers choose the optimal subset of products
to search, K  N; and incur a search cost for each product, so the total search cost is: Pi2K ci
where ci > 0 8i 2 N. Each products search cost (ci) is known prior to searching. Moreover, when
deciding on the optimal set of products to search, consumers have well dened beliefs about their
satiation relating to a product, i, and their overall preference for variety, . While search must be
undertaken to learn the attributes of specic products, consumers do have some idea regarding the
average price and attribute prole of the products, but have no other product specic information.
Expectations regarding the average attribute prole is given by ; while expectations of the average
price are given by p. Once search is undertaken, the true i and pi are revealed and the consumer
makes his purchase selection.
Specic products in the optimal consideration set are determined by product-level search
costs. Consumers then decide on the quantities to purchase subject to their remaining budget:
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y  
X
i2K
ci =
X
i2I
piqi (2.3)
where y is the total budgeted dollar value he has to spend on search and product purchases, and
I  K is the set of products chosen to purchase. The cardinality of the sets I and K are denoted
I, and K respectively. Consumers undertake search and how much money to commit to the search
process, while keeping in mind that the more search undertaken, the less will be available to spend
on the products themselves. Once search is completed, I assume the consumer has su¢ cient income
to purchase at least one good from the consideration set.3
2.2.1 Consumers Problem
Consumers rst select the optimal consideration set K to be searched in order to remove the
uncertainty about product attributes, e"i . They then determine the optimal quantities to purchase
given they are able to select multiple products in any possible quantity from the consideration set.
From the researchers perspective, consideration set formation is a complex problem as consumers
select the optimal subset of products from a total of 2N   1 possible subsets and then select which
products to actually purchase, yielding a total of S2(2)K more possibilities, where S2
(2)
K represents
the Stirling numbers of the second kind.4 The optimal consideration set is determined by using
backward induction so that the consumer rst solves for the maximum possible utility that can be
obtained from any subset K, and then determines the optimal subset to choose, K.
At the nal step, a consumer nds the optimal quantity to purchase of the ith good, given
some set of purchased goods, I and a set of searched goods, K for all possible i 2 I  K  N: The
maximum utility that can be attained is found by maximizing the utility function, subject to the
budget constraint, or:
max
X
i2I
e
 (e"i (qi + i))
 sub. to y = p
X
i2I
qi +
X
i2K
ci (2.4)
3It is straight forward to extend this to include a no purchase,or outside good option and is
made for expositional purposes.
4The Stirling numbers of the second kind (S2(N)K ) count the number of ways of partition-
ing a set of K elements into N unordered non-empty pairwise disjoint subsets. They sat-
isfy the following recurrence relationship: S2(N)K = K

S2
(N 1)
K

+ S2
(N 1)
K 1 and are dened as:
S2
(N)
K =
1
K!
PK
i=1 ( 1)K i
 
K
i

iN . The total number of partitions of an N -set is the sum of S2(N)K
over N which is called the Bell Number (Stanley 2011, pg. 82).
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by forming the Lagrangian:
L =
X
i2I
e
 (e"i (qi + i))

+ 
 
y   p
X
i2I
qi  
X
i2K
ci
!
: (2.5)
The necessary Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions (FOCs) with respect to the ith quantity purchased
simplify to:5
e
 (e"i (qi + i))
 1   p = 0 if qi > 0 8i (2.6a)
e
 (e"i (qi + i))
 1   p < 0 if qi = 0 8i (2.6b)
y  
X
i2K
ci = p
X
i2I
qi : (2.6c)
Equations (2.6a) and (2.6b) imply that the price-normalized marginal utility is equal for only those
goods that are purchased. Price-normalized marginal utilities for the non-purchased goods are
strictly less than those of the purchased goods, but still greater than 0. By taking the ratio of the
ith and jth FOCs given in (2.6a) and substituting each into the budget constraint I nd the optimal
quantity demanded for the purchased goods, qi (derived in detail in the appendix). Rearranging
terms I nd:
qi =
y  Pk2K ck + pPk2I k
e"i p
P
k2I e "k
  i if qi > 0 8i, (2.7)
which satises the conditions in equations (2.6).
2.2.2 Consideration Set Formation
Consumers choose the optimal quantity of each good to purchase qi given equation (2.7)
above, conditional on their expectations about product attributes. When determining the composi-
tion of their consideration set, consumers do not know which products will ultimately be purchased.
Therefore, they choose the consideration set such that they expect all the searched goods to end
up being purchased. In other words, the global set of goods N consists only of those goods the
consumer would reasonably expect to purchase if searched. For ease of exposition let the products
in K be indexed 1; 2; :::;K. From equation (2.2) consumersmaximum possible utility for a set of
5This is derived in detail in appendix A.
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products K, conditional on the expectations surrounding attributes and prices, is given by:
maxUK = e

KX
i=1
0@

y  PKk=1 ck + pPKk=1 k
p
PK
k=1 e
 "k
1A : (2.8)
Simplifying notation, I re-write the maximum utility above as:
maxUK = K (AK)

 
KX
k=1
e "k
! 
(2.9)
where AK = p 1

y  PKk=1 ck+PKk=1 k, and  is normalized to 0 without loss of generality. The
role of  is simply to shift the maximum utility up by e and does not have any bearing on which,
or how many, products are selected. Equation (2.9) is the consumers conditional net benet from
obtaining attribute and pricing information for any subset of goods from N. In this expression, the
term AK serves as the netting e¤ecton utility, compared to the more traditional way of accounting
for search costs which is to subtract them after utility is maximized. Instead, my model explicitly
accounts for search costs while nding the maximum utility possible. Because consumers are allowed
to make multiple product purchases, the cost of search is considered before taking the expectation
of the maximum utility.
Due to the uncertainty consumers have regarding the product attributes and prices, the
expected benet from searching any consideration set K, is given by:
E[maxUK] =
Z 1
 1
  
Z 1
 1
(maxUK) f("1; "2; :::; "N )d"1d"2   d"N (2.10a)
= (AK)

K
Z 1
 1
  
Z 1
 1
 
KX
k=1
e "k
!  KY
j=1
e "j
KY
j=1
e e
 "j
d"1d"2   d"K
=
 
y
p
+
KX
k=1

k  
ck
p
!
K   [K   ]
 [K]
(2.10b)
where   [] is the Gamma function which reduces to (K   1)! if K is an integer. Consumers choose
the consideration set that provides the greatest expected benet. The optimal composition of the
consideration set is the one that provides the maximum E[maxUK], or:
K = argmax
J
( 
y
p
+
X
k2J

k  
ck
p
! jJj   [jJj   ]
 [jJj]
)
; (2.11)
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where jJj represents the number of products in the set J  N. Since y=p is xed, consumers choose
products to include in K based on the di¤erence between their satisfaction for the product, k;
and the price-normalized cost of searching for that product, ckp . Moreover, because consumers know
their price expectation p, satisfaction k, and search cost ck; they can order the set of all goods in
N based on each goods contribution to the expected utility. Dene
Gi = i  
ci
p
(2.12)
and let the set of products in N be indexed as G1  G2      GN . Products are chosen to include
in the consideration set based on this ordering because Gi  Gj provides a higher expected benet.
Knowing the order in which products are added to the consideration set signicantly reduces the
total number of consideration sets that have to be compared to each other from 2N   1 to N . For
example, consumers know a priori they would not choose a consideration set composed of products
f1; 3g since the consideration set f1; 2g yields a higher expected benet. The key decision then
becomes the size of the consideration set to choose.
Consumers choose the consideration set containing the products i = 1; 2; :::;K such that:
GK+1 <
 
y
p
+
KX
i=1
Gi
! 
K
(K + 1) (K   )
 1

  1
!
; and (2.13a)
GK 
 
y
p
+
K 1X
i=1
Gi
! 
(K   1)
K (K   1  )
 1

  1
!
: (2.13b)
Following Roberts and Lattin (1991), consider the case when i is a decreasing linear function, or
i =    i ,  > 0 and assume ci = c 8i. The optimal number of products to search (K) satises
the following inequalities:
c >
p

y
p +K   K(K+1)2

K
(K+1)(K )
 1
   1

   + (K + 1) 


(K + 1) K

K
(K+1)(K )
 1

 ; and (2.14a)
c 
p

y
p + (K   1)    K(K 1)2

(K 1)
K (K 1 )
 1
   1

   +K


K   (K   1)

(K 1)
K (K 1 )
 1

 : (2.14b)
Even in the case of constant search costs and a linear specication for ; an analytical solution for
K is impossible to derive, due to the  term in the exponent.
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After the consumer determines the optimal consideration set K, the total cost of search is
removed from their income and they observe the attributes of all the goods in the chosen set. The
consumer then decides which goods to purchase, and their quantities. Product choices and quantities
are found by solving (2.4) for prices and product attributes (see appendix A). Maximizing the utility
function subject to the consumers budget constraint yields the following FOCs:
Li = ei (qi + i) 1   pi = 0 if qi > 0 8i (2.15a)
Li = ei (qi + i) 1   pi < 0 if qi = 0 8i (2.15b)
L = y  
X
i2K
ci  
X
i2I
piq

i = 0 (2.15c)
where Li = @L@qi , or the partial derivative of the Lagrangian function with respect to the ith good.
Solving for qi as before, yields a more general solution to equation (2.7):
qi =
~y +
P
i2I pkkP
i2I pk

pi exp[k]
pk exp[i]
$   i: (2.16)
for i and pi more generally, where $ = (  1) 1 and ~y = y  
P
i2K ck. For ease of exposition I
assume that the set of goods I  K are the goods for which qi > 0 and those goods in K, but
not in I, are not purchased.6 Knowing this, the consumer decides the optimal quantity of each
good to purchase based on equation (2.16) once prices and attributes are observed. The consumers
maximum utility from searching only the products in K and selecting the consumption bundle
q1 ; q

2 ; :::; q

I is given by:
maxU =
IX
i=1
ei
0@ ~y +PIk=1 pkkPI
k=1 pk

pi exp[k]
pk exp[i]
$
1A + KX
i=I+1
ei (i)

: (2.17)
The second order conditions that prove the solution qi is the maximum utility is provided in appendix
A. An important point here is that maximum utility is a function of both the purchased and non-
purchased products. The consumers maximum utility is, therefore, monotonically increasing in the
number of products searched, K.
6A bit of a conundrum arrises because the solution to qi is conditional on which goods are
actually chosen to be purchased. Therefore, when I changes, so does qi , so the set I should not be
considered trivial. This is because the analytical solution to qi does not apply to the non-chosen
goods. However, the solution to this is described in detail in the appendix A, and follows the logic
of Pinjari and Bhat (2009).
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2.3 Changes in the Cost of Search and Variety
The optimal consideration set is both endogenous to the consumers preferences, namely
preference for variety, and smaller than the universe of brands available in any one category. Because
of the prominence of search costs and the intensity of preference for variety, I demonstrate just how
the implications of my model di¤er from others due to these features. Therefore, in this section,
I show how a consumers consideration set changes when his or her cost of search, and preference
for variety, changes in a multi-purchase environment. My comparative static results follow from the
marginal benet of increasing the consideration set size from K to K+1 according to the consumers
product ordering dened by Gi in equation (2.12). I nd:
EU = lnE[maxUK[K+1]  lnE[maxUK]
= ln
240@1 + K+1   cK+1p
y
p +
PK
k=1
n
k   ckp
o
1A (K   )  K2   1
K2
!35 : (2.18)
This leads to:
Proposition 1 The marginal expected utility from searching an additional good increases as the
consumers preference for variety increases if  > 0.
Proof.
@EU
@
= ln
24 pK+1   cK+1
y + p
PK
k=1
n
k   ckp
o + 1
35+ 1
 K > 0:
Proposition 1 shows that consumerspreference for variety has a signicant impact on the
optimal consideration set. Simply put, as the consumers preference for variety increases, the gains
from searching a larger number of products increases. A consumer who quickly becomes satiated
with individual products and exhibits a higher preference for variety will search a wider range of
products because he is more likely to purchase more than one product. Therefore, the marginal
gains from search increase with the consumers preference for variety. Here, Proposition 1 requires
that  > 0, however, in the next section I show that the domain of  is restricted to 0 and 1. So,
requiring  > 0 is not a restriction from the perspective of search. Proposition 1 suggests that
consumer demand-search models that ignore preference for variety will under-predict the size of the
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consumers optimal consideration set. Consider an individual in the market for an automobile. He
may want both a BMW to commute to work, a Suburban to be able to haul the kids in and their
friends to soccer practice, and a motorcycle to drive on the weekends, but his budget restricts him
to purchase only one. Even though the consumer only purchases a single automobile, he still has a
preference for variety that drives him to consider several di¤erent alternatives. Without accounting
for preference for variety, a model of search would miss some of the vehicles the consumer actually
searched.
The notion that the cost of search is critical to the number of products searched is well
understood in the search literature. By allowing search costs to di¤er across products I am able to
generalize this relationship. Namely, I nd:
Proposition 2 The marginal expected utility from searching an additional good decreases as the
cost of searching an additional product increases.
Proposition 3 The marginal expected utility from searching an additional good increases when the
total cost of search for the products already in the consideration set increases.
Proof.
@EU
@cK+1
=   
p

y
p +
PK
k=1
n
k   ckp
o
K+1 
cK+1
p
y
p+
PK
k=1fk  ckp g + 1
 < 0; and
@EU
@ck
=


K+1   cK+1p

p

y
p +
PK
k=1
n
k   ckp
o2 K+1  cK+1p
y
p+
PK
k=1fk  ckp g + 1
 > 0:
Taken together, Propositions 2 and 3 imply that an individual will search a larger number of
products if ci is decreasing in N , and a smaller set of products if ci is increasing in N . This implies
that rms would want to drive consumers search costs as low as possible to increase the chance
that their product is purchased. If rm i is one of the rst few products selected the rm would
want the consumers search cost as low as possible in the hopes that the cost of searching prices and
attributes of the i+1 rm is a little higher, thus decreasing the cardinality of the consideration set.
Similarly, if rm j is close to N then they too would want consumers search costs to be as low as
possible to increase the chances that their good makes it into the nal consideration set.
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An implication of the second Proposition above is that the consumer recognizes that the
initial investment in searching products i = 1; 2; :::;K has already been exhausted and adding
an additional product to the consideration set yields more information when considering their nal
purchase decisions. As another example of how these propositions manifest in the real world, consider
advertising websites that provide rms the option of featuringtheir product on the front page, or
top of the website, or next to a product that is currently being considered. In e¤ect, the featuring
aspect of the advertisement decreases the consumers cost of searching an additional product, making
it more likely that particular product will end up in the consumers consideration set.
Intuitively, Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that rms would want to make the cost of searching
their own product as low as possible, and the cost of searching other products as high as possible.
In this sense, my intuition is opposite the strategic obfuscation models of Ireland (2007) and Ellison
and Ellison (2009). Nonetheless, this conclusion is intuitive, and is the same as that found in single-
product search models. However, some recent research has argued that it is in the rms best interest
to impose a larger search cost on consumers. Mayzlin and Shin (2011) argue that rms can use the
content of their advertisements to get consumers to search, or not search for more information about
the products they are o¤ering. They show that some rms will actually develop advertisements that
are devoid of any substantive information as a means of motivating consumers to search for, and
learn more information about, the attributes of the product on their own. In my notation, rms
are trying to inuence i, or the satisfaction the consumer expects to gain from the good. If, in my
model, consumers only had a small xed amount of income to spend on search, then those products
that know they will be searched rst would want to increase the cost of search to absorb as much
of the search budget as possible, thereby reducing their competition. In other words, if consumers
have a xed budget for search and cannot necessarily spend almost all their income, y, on search
then rms most likely to be in the consideration set (e.g. small i in Gi) would be better served to
make their search cost high to extract as much of the consumers search budget as possible, leaving
less for the remaining products that are farther down the search list.
My model implies that consumers rst decide the order of the products to include in the
consideration set, and then decide how many products to search. Therefore, some rms would want
to make cost of search high, while others lower down the search list would want to make the cost
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of searching for their product low. This intuition is also consistent with Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and
Cunat (2010) who show some rms may switch away from a mass market strategy to a niche market
strategy if their product is not as likely to be searched. By switching to the niche market strategy
the rm is able to move up the search list, and become more likely to be searched, albeit by a smaller
market.
The benet of a rm switching away from a mass market strategy to a niche market focus
can be readily seen from the following Propositions.
Proposition 4 The marginal expected utility from searching an additional good decreases as the
consumers satisfaction for an additional product decreases.
Proposition 5 The marginal expected utility from searching an additional good increases when the
consumers satisfaction for products currently under consideration increases.
Proof.
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Propositions 4 and 5 illustrate that the number of products in the consumers consideration
set will increase as the consumers satisfaction for the next unsearched product increases. Since the
consumer knows his satisfaction for all products, he will sample a larger number of products when
satisfaction is relatively high for all. Since k captures the rate at which consumers become satised
with a product, this is an intuitive result. As expected, if consumers quickly become satised with
the products in the category, they are going to search through a wider range of products because
they are more likely to benet from purchasing several products.
By directly accounting for a consumers budget in the search and purchase decision I nd
that as an individual becomes less price sensitive, he will choose consideration sets with a smaller
number of products. In other words, I nd:
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Proposition 6 The marginal expected utility from searching an additional good decreases as the
consumers income increases.
Proposition 7 The marginal expected utility from searching an additional good increases when the
consumers price expectation increases.
Proof.
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Propositions 6 and 7 illustrate that consumers are more likely to search over a large number
of products when the prices for the product are high, and choose to search less intensively. In other
words, a consumer with a higher opportunity cost of time is less likely to undertake extensive price
comparisons of brands across stores. A consumer who plans on purchasing an expensive digital
camera may still have a high opportunity cost of search, but their income is now considerably less
relative to the benet of searching for the good. In other words, his price expectation for a digital
camera is much higher than that for carbonated soft drinks and would sample a larger number of
cameras before making a purchase, compared to soft drinks.
Taken together, I nd that the search e¤ort will decrease as the cost of search increases,
which is consistent with prior studies (Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan 2003; Cachon, Terwiesch, and
Xu 2008; and Kuksov and Villas-Boas 2010), and I nd that search will increase as preference
for variety increases. In particular, consumers opt for considerations sets with a larger number
of products in them when their preference for variety increases. My research deviates from prior
consumer search studies in that search is endogenous to the cost of search as well as the consumers
preference for variety. Therefore, preference for variety forms a critical component of the search
decision and directly a¤ects the size of the consideration set chosen. The consideration set, in turn,
is an important driver of the nal purchase decision. In particular, if a consumer exhibits little to no
preference for variety and the consideration set that provides the highest expected maximum utility
given in equation (2.11) only has 1 product, then a consumer will allocate their remaining budget
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to the one searched item. On the other hand, if a strong preference for variety drives an individual
to select a consideration set of considerable size, then his optimal purchase decision becomes more
exible, and more complicated. In this case, the consideration set leaves the purchase decision
much more unrestricted. In particular, therefore, intuition suggests that preference for variety will
shape the optimal purchase decision through the consideration set when it is low. When there
is a signicant preference for variety it will shape the purchase decision more directly, since the
consideration set chosen is likely to have a larger number of alternatives from which to choose. I
investigate the relationship between preference for variety and consumer choice more formally next.
Because choice is conditional on the consideration set and a consideration set containing only 1
product makes the optimal purchase decision trivial, it is assumed that there are at least 2 products
from which to choose.
Once the optimal consideration set is determined, consumers learn the true attributes of the
searched items and uncertainty is resolved (i.e. "i = 0). An individual then makes his purchase
selection from within the set of searched goods K according to equation (2.16). As a rst step to
investigating consumer purchase behavior I conrm that demand indeed slopes downward in price.
In other words:
Lemma 8 The optimal quantity purchased of the ith good decreases when the price of that good
increases.
Proof. To determine how the optimal quantity purchased, qi , changes in relation to changes
in its price, pi, I di¤erentiate the FOCs given in equation (2.15) to obtain a system in inequalities:0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
L11 0    0  p1
0 L22    0  p2
...
...
. . .
...
...
0    0 LKK  pK
 p1  p2     pK 0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
@q1
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@pi
...
@qK
@pi
@
@pi
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA

0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
0
...

0
qi
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
; (2.19)
where the strict inequalities in the system of equations above apply to the goods that are not
purchased, qi = 0, and the equalities apply to the purchased goods, q

i > 0. Since I am only
interested in the relationship between the optimal quantity purchased and price for the goods that
are actually purchased I am only concerned with the equalities in the above system of equations. In
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determining the optimal purchased quantities among the searched goods, the number of purchased
products, I; is determined prior to nding the actual quantities.7 In other words, I assume I is
xed which implies parameter changes of purchased goods will have no e¤ect on the non-purchased
goods. To simplify the analysis I also assume that I = K, or that the consumer will purchase a little
bit of every searched good, even if it is an innitely small amount of the good. This allows me to
consider the a¤ect one good has on all the others in the consideration set. Solving the linear system
of equations above for @q

i
@pi
I nd:
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where Lii = @Li@qi =   (1  )ei (qi + i)
 2 andD is the determinant of the Hessian matrix which
is dened in equation (A.6) above.
As expected, the optimal quantity purchased decreases as the price of that good increases. Re-
call that equation (2.16) is only valid for those goods that are purchased, and does not apply to non-
purchased goods. Since my demand analysis requires that the quantity purchased of a good decrease
as the price of that good increases, or demand slopes down, this necessarily requires that  2 [0; 1]. If
 < 0 then the expression  (1  ) < 0 and @qi@pi < 0 if and only if qi pi < 

(1 )
PK
k 6=i
(pk)
2
ek(qk+k)
 2
or the total amount spent on the ith product is less than 

(1 )
PK
k 6=i
(pk)
2
ek(qk+k)
 2 which does not
have a clear interpretation. Therefore, I assume  2 [0; 1] which also rules out the possibility of
gross compliment goods. Namely,
Lemma 9 The consideration set is comprised of only substitute goods if and only if  2 [0; 1]:
7For a discussion, see appendix A or Pinjari and Bhat (2009).
25
Proof. Solving the system of equations given in (2.19) for
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The quantity purchased of a good will increase as the price of another good increases so long as
pi
(1 )ei(qi+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 2  qi . In other words, the ith good is a gross substitute for any other good if
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Using equation (2.15a) I solve for  (e.g.  = 1pi e
i (qi + i)
 1
; 8i) and substitute this de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into the above expression to nd:
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Therefore, the ith good is a compliment good if

1
(1 )   1

(qi + i) < i: To avoid the comple-
mentarity,  must be bound between 0 and 1: The expression

1
(1 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> 0 when  2 [0; 1] and
1
(1 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< 0 otherwise. Furthermore, note that when  is bound, the expression

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)   1

attains a minimum value of 3 at 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
1
(1 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
(qi + i) > i, or all the goods are
substitutes.
When consumers make a search/purchase decision in a single category setting such as car-
bonated soft drinks or clothing items such as jeans, where the goods under consideration are known
substitutes,  must be restricted to be between 0 and 1. In other words, the reason that a consumer
makes multiple purchases in a single category is largely driven by satiation and preference for variety
rather than because he plans to use the products together. For example, most American teenagers
purchase multiple pairs of jeans at once, but rarely wear several pairs at the same time.
The price elasticity expressions for consumer demand is dened as the cross price elasticity
ij =
pi
qj
@qj
@pi
where
@qj
@pi
is dened in equation (2.21), and the own price elasticity ii =
pi
qi
@qi
@pi
where
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@qi
@pi
is given in equation (2.20). An interesting characteristic of the demand model considered here
is that both the own and cross price elasticity formulas are directly dependent on the attributes
of all the purchased goods, which are dependent on the chosen consideration set. Therefore, the
consideration set the consumer decides on critically a¤ects how the quantity purchased of the ith
good will change with the observed price of that good, or another good. This leads to:
Corollary 10 The cross price elasticity for any 2 purchased goods will decrease (increase) when the
average price of all the searched goods increases (decreases).
Corollary 10 shows the importance of the consideration set to the consumers nal purchase
decision. Intuitively, if a rm that sells a particular good knows that the consumer will sample
products according to the ordering of Gi, and is also aware that they are high on the list to be
sampled, the rm would be more likely to charge a higher price (assuming it does not a¤ect the
consumers price expectation). If prices were decreasing according to the ordering of the average
consumers Gi, this would suggest that the average price of a smaller set of products would be higher
than that of a consideration set with a large number of products. Based on this intuition, the cross
price elasticities for goods in a smaller sample of products would be smaller than the cross price
elasticity of a larger number of products. Said di¤erently, the quantity purchased of a particular
good would be less sensitive to price changes of other goods when the consumer only samples a small
number of products. In sampling a small number of products the consumer will have spent less on
search and will have more money to use for the actual purchasing of products. This somewhat
counter-intuitive result stems from the fact that I consider both the cost of search and the cost of
the products in the budget constraint.
The cross price elasticity is also a¤ected by all the parameters of all the purchased goods.
However, I consider these parameterse¤ects on the quantity purchased more directly. Namely, I nd
that the optimal quantity purchased of a particular good, qi , will decrease as that goods satiation
parameter, i, increases, or the satiation parameter of another good decreases. In other words:
Proposition 11 As consumers becomes satiated with a particular product they will switch away
from that product to another.
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Proof. Di¤erentiating the FOCs given in equation (2.15) produces the following matrix of
equations:0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
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Proposition 11 suggests that as the consumers satisfaction for a particular product increases
he will purchase less. This is because the price-normalized marginal utility of all the other goods
is being held constant. In this case, the consumer does not need to purchase as much of product i
to gain the same benet. The price-normalized marginal utility of a particular good increases as i
increases (i.e. @
2U
@qi @i
> 0) suggesting that i increases the consumers satisfaction for that particular
good. Similarly, I nd the relationship between the optimal quantity purchased and the products
attributes also decreases, where increasing values of i represent a product that has more appealing
attributes. Namely,
Proposition 12 As the attractiveness of a products attributes increase the optimal quantity pur-
chased of that good will decrease.
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Proof. The di¤erentiated FOCs produce the following matrix of equations:0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
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As with product satisfaction, Proposition 12 shows that the consumer will purchase less of a
particular good when that goods product attributes become more attractive because the consumer
attains the same level of satisfaction by purchasing less. The marginal benet an individual good
provides increases as i increases, or
@2U
@qi @i
= @U

@qi
> 0. The Propositions above for i and i
illustrate the importance of taking the consumers multiproduct purchase decision into consideration.
Because the consumer is able to purchase multiple products, he selects those goods that provide the
highest level of satisfaction, and then distributes his budget over those goods. However, because
consumers can select multiple products in continuous quantities, they will purchase smaller quantities
of the goods that provide the highest level of price-normalized satisfaction. From an intuitive
perspective, rms want consumers to have a high degree of satisfaction for their product(s), so price
products in such a way that they are more likely to fall into a consumersconsideration sets.
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Consumerssatiation and preference for variety have important implications for new product
introductions. When a new product is introduced a consumer will not have well dened belief
regarding his satisfaction for the product (i.e. i is unknown for a new product). In the search
stage, therefore, the consumer is uncertain about where exactly the product falls in the ordering of
the Gis. Nonetheless, consumers do know the cost of search. This suggests that, when introducing
a new product, rms want to decrease consumers costs of both searching for, and consuming,
products. This intuition explains why rms give out free samples at grocery stores and other events.
A free sample essentially reduces the consumers search cost to 0, and helps them form a measure
of satisfaction for the product. This in turn helps the consumer position the new product in the
ordering of the Gis for the next shopping trip when the cost of search is not 0.
Finally, I consider how changes in  a¤ect the optimal quantity purchased. This relationship
is more ambiguous than the other parameters because of the ubiquity of  in the FOCs for all K
goods. Di¤erentiating the FOCs with respect to  for all goods I obtain the matrix of equations:0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
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where
@Li
@
= ei (qi + i)
 1
(1 +  ln [qi + i]) : (2.23)
Notice in equation (2.23) above that @Li@ > 0 if (q

i + i) >e
  1 . So, the relationship between the
FOCs and  begins with uncertainty. Namely, the price normalized marginal utility of a particular
good may not necessary increase as  increases. However, the condition that @Li@ > 0 is not di¢ cult
to satisfy because the right hand side of the inequality attains its maximum value as  approaches 1
at approximately e 1  0:37. So, if qi is purchased in a unit increment of 1 the condition is satised,
or if qi = 0 but I nd i >e
 1, the condition is satised. If i were restricted (or normalized) to
be between 0 and e 1 the consumer would immediately know that qi = 0 for all i products such
that @Li@ < 0 and q

j > 0 for all j when
@Li
@ > 0. A consumer knows exactly which products should
be purchased, or belong in I, and which should not. The consumer could then decide how many
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products to search with more precision since  and i are known. When i is left unrestricted, the
contents of the set of purchased goods, I, is more cumbersome to nd. The utility maximization
section of the appendix provides a discussion regarding the way consumers determine which products
to purchase, and the quantities thereof.
Looking at the relationship between the optimal quantity purchased and  more closely I
solve the above matrix of equations for the ith good to nd:
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 2 :
The relationship between the optimal quantity purchased of the ith good and , therefore, depends
on the relationship between that good and all the other goods in the consideration set, in a complex
way. It is possible that  increases the quantity purchased for some goods, while decreasing it for the
remaining goods in the consideration set. The complexity that arises between the optimal quantity
purchased and  is due to the fact that  is the same for all the goods. If  was instead product
specic, the derivatives would be similar to those of i and i above. In other words, relaxing the
denition of i =  8i actually fails to clarify the relationship between the quantity purchased and
. That said, the relationship between the marginal utility of income ; and  is more denitive.
Specically:
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Proposition 13 The marginal utility of income decreases as  moves from 0 to 1 so long as
(qi + i) >e
  1 , 8i.
Proof. I have:
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PK
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2
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Proposition 13 implies that the relationship between the consumers utility and income will
decrease as  increases from 0 to 1. In other words, as  gets closer to 0, changes in the consumers
income will lead to increasingly higher levels of utility. Therefore,  can be thought of as the degree
of price sensitivity. Without going through the comparative statics, this same notion is clear from
the functional form of the utility function given in equation (2.2). As  increases from 0 to 1 the
contribution to the total utility of any qi > 0 will be greater, and utility rises from those i goods
that are purchased. More formally, I nd @maxU@ > 0 (see Appendix for proof).
Finally, the consumers total utility is dened over all searched products, not just the pur-
chased products. As a result, all the products searched contribute to the consumers maximum
utility because the price-normalized marginal utility of the non-purchased products, while less than
the purchased products, are all greater than 0. This is also evident from the functional form of
equation (2.2). The utility function is dened for all K searched goods, so unless both the quantity
purchased and the satisfaction for the product are both 0 the good will make a contribution to utility
just by being in the consideration set. Moreover, since search costs are assumed to be positive, it
would be a contradiction to the search rule if a consumer were to choose a consideration set with a
product that has i = 0. If the satisfaction parameter were zero, the consumers expected maximum
utility would be lower than the same consideration set that did not contain the ith product. There-
fore, all searched goods make a contribution to the consumers total utility because the consumer is
able to learn about the attributes and prices of purchased and non-purchased goods.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I extend the analysis of consumer search to consider the case when consumers
have a preference for variety, which may lead them to purchase multiple products. I show that when
consumer preferences for variety are increasing, consumers will search a larger number of products.
32
More search, however, does not necessarily lead to more purchase unless a truly preferred product is
found. The main implication of this chapter is that consumer search models that ignore preference
for variety may, therefore, underpredict the degree of search if consumers do indeed prefer variety.
While prior experimental consumer search studies (Dickson and Sawyer 1990) found that
consumers did not search enough, more recent research (Zwick, Rapoport, Lo, and Muthukrishnan
2003) nds evidence of the opposite consumers search too much relative to the optimal stopping
point. The theoretical predictions of my model are consistent with more recent research and o¤er
an explanation as to why consumers appear to search too much. Previous research rarely considered
consumers preference for variety when predicting search, and did not allow this preference for
variety to manifest in multiple-purchases. My model o¤ers one of the rst explanations as to why
consumers may over-search, namely because they prefer variety, and obtain utility from searching
over multiple variants, so continue to search rather than purchase. I conrm this insight using an
economic experiment later in a later chapter.
My analysis does have several limitations. First, the theoretical model of consumer search and
preference for variety does not consider rm response to consumer demand. Within the framework
above, it is assumed that the desired number of products are available to search. While this is likely to
be a reasonable assumption in many consumer goods categories, particularly mature markets, it may
be less applicable to highly innovative consumer product markets. Moreover, without considering
rm behavior I can not comment on how equilibrium prices will response to increasing preferences
for variety.
Second, I assume that consumers know the satiation rate, or rate of satisfaction, for every
product, but not its attributes. Future work may benet by relaxing this assumption and making
the consumers satiation parameter random. This would impart some realistic uncertainty regarding
the order in which products are searched and information is acquired. Finally, I use a specic
functional assumption for the utility consumers obtain in order to get precise predictions about the
consideration set. Assuming a specic functional form leads to a closed form expression for the
integral that describes the consumers maximum expected utility from search. Future work may
benet by relaxing the functional form and instead consider a more general utility expression.
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CHAPTER 3.
DEMAND FOR VARIETY UNDER COSTLY CONSUMER SEARCH
3.1 Introduction
Interest in understanding consumer search behavior has grown with the prominence of online
search. Yet, the cost of search is more important to o­ ine purchases, and o­ ine commerce still
dominates consumer packaged good sales. SymphonyIRIs MarketPulse survey (2011), for example,
found that fully 40% of consumers shop at multiple stores to obtain the lowest price possible. Simply
put, in order for a good or service to be sold, it must rst be in a consumers consideration set, and
to be considered, it must be searched. Relatively little is known about how the composition of the
consideration set a¤ects the nal purchase decision. If a single unit of one item is purchased, then
the nal choice decision may not be particularly sensitive to the composition of the consideration
set (Honka and Chintagunta 2013). However, if consumers purchase multiple products in di¤ering
quantities, as is common in categories such as food and clothing, then the consideration set becomes
more important. In this study, I develop a structural empirical model of consideration set formation
when product information is uncertain, and an individual is allowed to purchase multiple products
in continuous quantities.
Existing empirical models of search behavior examine retail environments that are highly
specialized, and generally do not reect the unique nature of search for products o¤ered by multi-
product retailers. Wildenbeest (2011) derives a structural model of search and product di¤erenti-
ation in which he estimates search costs from di¤erences in aggregate, store-level prices. However,
by aggregating prices over individual products into representative "shopping baskets" he ignores
the multi-product nature of search within supermarkets. Further, he assumes, as do others, that
consumers know the number of products to search, before search is undertaken (Zwick, Rapoport,
Lo, and Muthukrishnan 2003). Deciding on the number of products to consider, however, is an in-
tegral element of search. In this study, I extend Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan (2003) and Koulayev
(2010) by developing a structural model of endogenous consideration set formation in the presence
of product information uncertainty in a multi-product retail environment.
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From a multi-product retailers perspective, the number of products consumers actively con-
sider is an important piece of information. Both the depth and content of a retailers assortment are
perhaps the most important decisions he or she makes (Koelemeijer and Oppewal 1999; Boatwright
and Nunes 2001; Borle, Boatwright, Nunes, and Shmueli 2005; Oppewal and Koelemeijer 2005;
Richards and Hamilton 2006; Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox 2009). Moreover, there is an ongoing
debate whether to expand or contract the number of products o¤ered. Empirical evidence shows
that consumers are worse o¤ from having too many choices (Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Iyengar,
Huberman, and Jiang 2004; Diehl and Poynor 2010; and Kuksov and Villas-Boas 2010) while others
show consumers are better o¤ with more options (Eaton and Lipsey 1979; Chernev 2003a, 2003b;
Hutchinson 2005), particularly when the product category is a familiar one. Through a number of
experiments, Berger, Draganska, and Simonson (2007) show that o¤ering more products, even with
only slight modications, increases the perception of quality. Further, they show that a brand with
more variants can command a competitive advantage. In contrast to a number of empirical studies
(e.g. Dreze, Hoch, and Purk 1994; and Boatwright and Nunes 2001) Borle, Boatwright, Kadane,
Nunes, and Shmueli (2005) nd that large-scale assortment reductions harm store level sales by
reducing customer retention, shopper frequency, and purchase quantity. Therefore, understanding
which products consumers are not only purchase, but also consider, is fundamentally important to
assortment and promotion decisions.1
Researchers rarely model the preference for variety in an explicit way. Yet, demand for
variety leads to multiple purchases of either the same or competing brands, which invalidates many
common models of consumer demand based on the discrete-choice assumption. For example, Dubé
(2004) nds that only 49% of the trips involving carbonated soft drink purchases conform to a single
purchase assumption. In other words, current demand-search models are not applicable to 51%
of carbonated soft drink purchases. Dubé (2004) also shows that single-purchase demand models
lead to incorrect marketing mix variables when consumers purchase multiple items at the same
time. However, Dubés (2004) model is only appropriate for products that are purchased in discrete
1Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, Todd (2010) conduct a meta-analysis that seeks to test the "choice
overload hypothesis" or the idea that too many products negatively a¤ect consumer welfare and can
deter consumers from making a purchase. Their ndings indicate that the "choice overload hypoth-
esis" was not robust. Instead, consumers prefer a large number of options when their preferences
are well dened.
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increments, like cans of soda or bottles of ketchup. Recognizing that consumers can often purchase
products in continuous quantities, Bhat (2005, 2008) uses a more general framework (based on
Hanemann (1978, 1984) and Wales and Woodland (1983)) to extend the familiar logit model to allow
for the observation that consumers can purchase multiple discrete brands in continuous quantities.
Bhats (2005, 2008) multiple-discrete continuous extreme model provides a realistic framework for
many CPG purchases, but still ignores a key feature of retail grocery markets.
Namely, Bhat (2005, 2008) assumes search is costless, and consumers are perfectly informed.
However, consumer uncertainty and the cost of search are critical to understanding demand (Stigler
1961). Even when searching online, Hann and Terwiesch (2003) show that consumers have a per-
ceived search cost of about $5 for each online search activity undertaken. Even if approximately
accurate, search costs of this magnitude will almost certainly lead to some products being ignored.
On the other hand, while the actual monetary cost of searching non-durable goods may not be as
high the cost of inspecting, thinking about, and retaining product information provide a signicant
barrier to searching and considering all available products (Shugan 1980; and Roberts and Lattin
1991). Such cognitive search costs restrict consumers attention to a subset of the total products
available. Therefore, my model accounts for costly search and allows for multiple products to be
purchased in continuous quantities. In this way, I empirically estimate consumer behavior typical
of many multi-product retail environmentssupermarkets, department stores, club stores and many
othersthat dominate consumersshopping experiences. By allowing for both interior and exterior
solutions my model is also general enough to apply categories in which a single item is regularly
purchased.
This study contributes to the literature on consumer demand and search in a number of ways.
First, I account for the purchase of multiple products on each shopping occasion. Second, I recognize
that consumerspreference for variety and cost of search are critical variables in shaping their consid-
eration sets, and ultimately, product purchases. Third, my model provides a framework that allows
practitioners and researchers to empirically determine the number of products consumers search
through before making their purchase decision. The structural model I develop combines empirical
search models (Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan 2003; and Koulayev 2010) with the continuous/discrete
demand model literature (Hanemann 1978, 1984; Kim, Allenby, and Rossi 2002; Bhat 2005, 2008;
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and Satomura, Kim, and Allenby 2011). In so doing I extend both streams of research to provide a
unied framework for modeling consumer purchase behavior.
3.2 A Multi-Discrete/Continuous Demand Model with Costly Consumer Search
In this section, I describe an empirical model of demand that allows for multiple discrete
/ continuous purchases, and positive search costs. While I develop the model for application to
household-level scanner or survey data, it is su¢ ciently general to apply to data generated by any
costly search-and-choice process.
Assume the set of products available to the consumer is written as N = f1; 2; :::; Ng. Given
the set of products N, consumers can purchase any combination of the N in any quantity. An
individuals total utility is assumed to be the additive contribution provided by each searched and
purchased product. In addition to product attributes and market prices, consumers also have some
level of satisfaction for each product, and a preference for variety across the category. Total utility,
U , from a particular shopping occasion, t, from purchasing multiple products within N is given by,
omitting the time subscript t:
U =
X
i
ei (e"i (qi + i))
 (3.1)
where qi is the quantity purchased of good i (qi  0). i is the satiation, or satisfaction, the consumer
obtains from product i. i is assumed constant across purchase occasions t, and well dened for the
consumer but unknown to the researcher (Kim, Allenby, and Rossi 2002; Bhat 2005; and Satomura,
Kim, and Allenby 2011). Product attributes are unknown prior to the purchase occasion and the
consumer must undertake costly search in order to resolve this uncertainty. However, the consumers
satisfaction for the products, i, is known. For example, when making a purchase in a category that
is well-understood, an individual will know their satisfaction for products that have been purchased
and consumed many times in the past. That said, the consumer is unaware of the specic price for
each product prior to the shopping trip.
A larger i represents a good that provides a higher degree of satisfaction. The parameter 
captures the consumers preference for variety, and is bound between 0 and 1 to ensure all goods are
substitute goods as discussed in Chapter 2. As  increases from 0 to 1 the consumers preference for
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variety decreases across all products equally, holding everything else constant.2 Finally, ei captures
product-specic characteristics such as shelf location, or the amount of sugar, or fat in ice cream for
example. Baseline marginal utility represents the increment in utility for the rst unit consumed.
As discussed by Kim, Allenby, and Rossi (2002) and Bhat (2005), the utility function in (3.1) is a
translated utility function that is valid so long as ei > 0.
The utility equation (3.1) above is very similar to Bhat (2005), except for the error term
e"i . The error term e"i represents product uncertainty, and is assumed to be independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) Type 1 Extreme Value (or Gumbel). The consumers uncertainty
regarding product attributes a¤ects utility in a fundamental way. Namely, the error term e"i shifts
the consumers perceived utility up or down because it is inside the expression (e"i (qi + i))
.
Research that allows for multiple product purchases assumes search is costless and consumers search
across the entire set of available products (Bhat 2005; 2008; von Haefen and Phaneuf, 2005; Pinjari,
and Bhat 2010; Satomura, Kim, and Allenby 2011; and Bhat, Castro, and Pinjari 2012). Instead, the
utility function above captures the notion that information comes at a cost, and uncertainty must
be mitigated before a purchase decision can be made. The cost of acquiring product information
is ci for the ith product searched. By engaging in search and paying ci, the consumer resolves the
error, e"i :
The uncertainty for brand i is eliminated when the consumer incurs the search cost ci. The
search cost, ci; is known prior to search, and is allowed to di¤er across individual products. It
captures the total cost of learning the complete set of information on a particular product, namely
its price, sugar content, package size, etc.
I follow Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan (2003) and Koulayev (2010) and assume consumers fol-
low a xed-sample search process.3 An individual, therefore, chooses an optimal subset of products
to search, K  N; so the total search cost is Pi2K ci. For those products that are searched, the
products attributes are revealed and uncertainty alleviated, "i = 0, and the consumer makes his
2The interpretation of i and  are manifestations of the model specication. For a discussion,
see Bhat (2005; 2008).
3See Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006) for a review of the xed sample size search literature.
Honka (2013) provides a discussion regarding the di¤erences between xed-sample search, and se-
quential search.
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purchase decision. However, the researcher is unable to observe all product attributes, so i repre-
sents a random variable that is assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Type
1 Extreme Value (Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan 2003; Bhat 2005; 2008). Assuming i is a random
variable, or i = i + i, captures the notion that consumers know the attributes of the products
searched, but they are not known to the researcher. Consumers have well dened beliefs about their
general satisfaction with a product, i, and their overall preference for variety, , but only have
a general idea regarding the attributes of the products, which leads to search. Expectations for
product attributes are denoted ; and the expectation for price is p.
Once search is undertaken, the true i and pis are revealed. The consumer then makes
his purchase decision from the products in the chosen consideration set. However, i remains
unobservable to the researcher, so is treated as a random variable (Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan
2003; Bhat 2005, 2008; Honka 2013). The analyst is able to observe the true prices, while the
consumers i and  are parameters to be estimated. Consumers select the optimal consideration
set based on the cost of searching each product, and then decide on the quantities to purchase
subject to their remaining budget:
y  
X
i2K
ci =
X
i2I
piqi > 0 (3.2)
where y is the total budgeted dollar value and I  K is the set of products the consumer chooses to
purchase within the consideration set K. The total number of products in the sets I and K are I,
and K respectively. Consumers decide how much money to commit to search while keeping in mind
that the more search undertaken, the less they will be able to spend on the products themselves.
It is assumed that consumers make their search decision such that they are able to purchase some
positive quantity of at least one of the goods. It is straightforward to extend the utility function in
equation (3.1) to include a "no purchase," or outside good option, that is costless. The no purchase
assumption is common in the search literature when a single good is purchased (Chiang, Chib,
and Narasimhan, 1999; Kim, Albuqurque, and Bronnenberg 2010; de los Santos, Hortacsu, and
Wildenbeest 2012; Honka 2013; and Honka and Chintagunta 2013). Since my data does not have no
purchase choice occasions I use the former interpretation and assume not all of the budget will be
spent on search.
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3.2.1 Consumers Problem
Consumers choose purchase quantities conditional on exhausting some of their budget on
search. I solve this problem by backward induction. Consumers rst solve for the maximum possible
utility that can be obtained for any consideration setK, given attribute and price expectations. With
this, the size (or number of products) of the optimal consideration set, K, and the specic products
in it, are determined simultaneously by nding the set that provides the highest expected maximum
utility. At this point, the consumer must evaluate all possible subsets to nd the best one.
Assuming a xed-sample size search process leads to a dimensionality problem, because every
possible permutation must be considered, leading to 2N   1 possible consideration set evaluations.
The dimensionality problem is a common manifestation of the xed-sample size search assumption
and restricts the applicability of the subsequent search-demand models to situations in which only
a small number of options are available (Mehta, Rajiv, Srinivasan 2003). However, the multi-
product purchase nature of my model avoids the curse of dimensionality, and leads to only N
subsets requiring evaluation. Once the expected maximum utility has been found for all N subsets,
the optimal consideration set is selected and consumers incur search costs. After the search stage,
product attributes are known and utility (e.g. eqn. 3.1) is maximized. Specic products, and the
quantity of each product, are selected subject to the remaining budget.
In the rst stage, I begin by nding the optimal quantity of the ith good given some set of
purchased goods, I, and a set of searched goods, K, for all possible i 2 I  K  N: Maximum utility
is found by maximizing the utility given in equation (3.1) for qi, conditional on attribute and price
expectations  and p respectively, subject to the budget constraint. Namely, I solve the problem:
max
X
i2I
e
 (e"i (qi + i))
 sub. to y = p
X
i2I
qi +
X
i2K
ci (3.3)
by forming the Lagrangian:
L =
X
i2I
e
 (e"i (qi + i))

+ 
 
y   p
X
i2I
qi  
X
i2K
ci
!
: (3.4)
Notice in the problem given in equation (3.3) that the total cost of search is over all K products,
while utility is only obtained from the I purchased products. Because product attributes, including
price, are assumed uncertain at each purchase occasions, obtaining the information for products not
purchased does not provide any benet. Only those products that are purchased and consumed (i.e.
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qi > 0) provide the consumer with any benet. The rst order Kuhn-Tucker conditions (rst-order
conditions, or FOC) with respect to the ith quantity purchased are:
e
 (e"i (qi + i))
 1   p = 0 if qi > 0 8i (3.5a)
e
 (e"i (qi + i))
 1   p < 0 if qi = 0 8i (3.5b)
y  
X
i2K
ci = p
X
i2I
qi : (3.5c)
The conditions (3.5a) and (3.5b) suggest that the marginal utility of all the purchased products are
equal, and is greater than the marginal utility of the non-purchased goods. The optimal demand for
qi satises the conditions in equations (3.5) 8i 2 N.
The optimal quantity demanded is found by taking the ratio of the ith and jth conditions
given in (3.5a) and substituting the result into the budget constraint, (this is derived in detail in
appendix A.2). Rearranging terms I nd:
qi =
y  Pk2K ck + pPk2I k
e"i p
P
k2I e "k
  i; 8qi > 0: (3.6)
3.2.2 Consideration Set Formation
Consumers choose the optimal quantity of each good to purchase based upon expectations
about product attributes and prices. Let the products in K be indexed 1; 2; :::; I; I + 1; :::;K where
1; 2; :::; I are the products purchased, and I + 1; :::;K are the products searched but not purchased.
The maximum utility for any set of products K, conditional on expected attributes and prices, is
given by:
maxUK = e

IX
i=1
0@

y  PKk=1 ck + pPIk=1 k
p
PI
k=1 e
 "k
1A : (3.7)
In this expression, the entire search cost,
PK
k=1 ck; is absorbed by, or spread across, all the purchased
goods. In contrast to single purchase search-demand models, the maximum utility above recognizes
that consumers have a preference for variety that directly governs the number of di¤erent products
purchased, and the number of products searched. As the preference for variety increases, both the
number of products searched, and the number of products purchased increase. So, while a higher
preference for variety leads to a larger total search cost, this cost is spread over a number of unique
products. On the other hand, equation (3.7) above implies that consumers with little preference
for variety will search and purchase fewer unique products. My model, therefore, captures choice
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situations in which an individual may only purchase a single product, or the behavior described by
classic discrete choice models, but also allows for multi-product purchase situations. The maximum
total utility is written as:
maxUK = I (AK)

 
IX
k=1
e "k
! 
(3.8)
where AK = p 1

y  PKk=1 ck +PIk=1 k, and  is normalized to 0 without loss of generality as
its role is simply to shift the maximum utility up or down by e. Attribute expectations, therefore,
will a¤ect the total value of the maxUK but do not drive the consideration set decision. The error
expression
PI
k=1e
 "k in the maxUK is Erlang(I; 1) distributed with a mean and variance of I.4
distributed Equation (3.8) provides the consumers net benet from obtaining product attribute
information for any subset of goods K, conditional on his expectations for prices p.
Knowing that the error associated with product uncertainty, "i, is Gumbel distributed the
expected benet from any subset of products K  N is given by (which is derived in detail in
Appendix B):
E[maxUK] =
Z 1
 1
  
Z 1
 1
(maxUK) f("1; "2; :::; "N )d"1d"2   d"N (3.9a)
= (AK)

I
Z 1
 1
  
Z 1
 1
 
IX
k=1
e "k
!  IY
j=1
e "j
IY
j=1
e e
 "j
d"1d"2   d"I
=
 
y
p
+
IX
k=1

k  
ck
p

 
KX
k=I+1
ck
p
!
I   [I   ]
  [I]
; (3.9b)
where   [] is the Gamma function.5 The expression maxUK gives the maximum possible utility
that can be attained for any income, price expectation, product satisfaction, preference for variety,
and cost of search. An important distinguishing feature of my multi-product purchase model from
a classic search-demand logit model is that the expected maximum utility expression in equation
(3.9b) above is net of search costs because the budget constraint is recognized. The maxUK is takes
into account the cost of search and how the other parameters, namely preference for variety and price
4The Erlang distribution is a special case of the Gamma distribution because I is an integer.
5The Gamma function is dened as   [z] =
R1
0
tz 1e tdt. When z is a positive integer   [z]
simplies to (z   1)!.
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expectation, a¤ect the way the cost of search inuences maxUK. That is, a consumers maximum
utility is determined, the expectation taken, and search costs subtracted. The optimal consideration
set is then determined from the di¤erence between the expected maximum utility and the total
cost of search, or max fE[maxu] Pi cig, where u is the indirect utility.6 Because my model is
derived under the assumption that consumers maximize utility subject to a budget constraint, the
cost search is directly taken into account when determining the maximum utility.
From the expected maximum utility equation above, it is clear that the consumer wants to
select a consideration set, K, as close to the set of goods purchased, I, as possible. Intuitively,
the consumer has a limited amount of money to spend during a particular purchase occasion and
does not want to pay for product information that provides them no benet. However, before
undertaking search, it is impossible to determine which goods will ultimately be purchased since
this hangs critically on the price and product information an individual obtains only after search.
Therefore, when deciding which consideration set to choose, it is assumed that I = K, or that
all possible consideration sets are comprised of goods the consumer expects to consume. This is
equivalent to assuming the global set of products N is made up of products that are appealing on
some level. Intuitively, I am assuming that a consumer will not spend money and obtain product
information for a product they know a priori they will not possibly purchase.
Consumers choose the consideration set that provides the greatest expected benet, or the
one that provides the highest E[maxUK] for any possible K  N. The optimal size and composition
of the consideration set is, therefore, determined by:
K = argmax
J
( 
y
p
+
X
k2J

k  
ck
p
! jJj   [jJj   ]
 [jJj]
)
; (3.10)
where jJj represents the size, or number of products in the set J  N. Since y=p is xed, consumers
choose products to include in K based on the di¤erence between their satisfaction for the product,
k; and the price normalized cost of searching for that product,
ck
p . Therefore, products are add to the
consideration set based on the ordering i  cip  j  cjp      k  ckp . Let Gi = i  cip . Because
price expectation p, satisfaction k, and search cost ck; are all known prior to search consumers order
the global set of products N by Gi, so the set of products in N is indexed G1  G2      GN .
6Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) provide the derivation of E[maxu].
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Knowing the order to add products to the choice set signicantly reduces the total number of possible
consideration sets from 2N 1 to N . However, the di¤erence between Gi and Gi only determines the
other products are added. The size of the consideration set is determined by the consideration set J
that provides the largest E[maxUK]. The right hand side of equation (3.10), ( [jJj]) 1 jJj  [jJj   ],
and  are primarily responsible for determining the size of the consideration set which is driven by
the consumers preference for variety.
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Figure 3.1
Example of E[maxUK] for di¤erent values of 
To make help make this idea concrete consider the following example. The global set of
products N contains 11 items ordered according to G1  G2      GN . The specic values for
Gi, i = 1; :::; 11 are: {7.67, 7.67, 5.53, 2.69, 0.25, -1.37, -2.28, -2.71, -2.89, -2.96, -2.99} and let
y
p = 5: The E[maxUK] values are shown in gure 3.1 for di¤erent values of . From the gure it is
obvious that the optimal consideration set consisting of only the rst product will be selected when
  0:75. This is the result of the right hand side of the expectation because as   [1  ] ! 1
as  ! 1. As  decreases and moves toward 0 preference for variety increases and K = 6 when
 = 0:6. As  gets close to 0 the specic values of Gi no longer matter and there is an overwhelming
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preference for variety and K = 11. The non-linearity of the curves is a result of Gi < 0 for some
of the products in N. Both i and ci are greater than 0 however, there is no reason why i > ci
and so negative values cause a non-linear shape when E[maxUK] is calculated over the N possible
consideration sets. If Gi > 0 8i then the curves will slope downward, or upward depending on ,
and the consideration sets at the extreme will provide the highest E[maxUK].
The size of the optimal consideration set depends not only on the comparison between each
products expected contribution, but also on the preference for variety. From the analysts perspec-
tive the probability that the Kth consideration set is chosen is equivalent to the probability that
E[maxUK] is the largest, or E[maxUK] = max fE[maxU1]; :::; E[maxUN]g. Then, the cumulative
distribution function for the probability that K is the optimal consideration set is given by:
Pr [K = K] (3.11)
= Pr [E[maxUK ] = max fE[maxU1]; :::; E[maxUN]g]
= Pr [E[maxU1] < E[maxUK]] \    \ Pr [E[maxUN] < E[maxUK]] :
Looking at the Kth and Jth consideration set I nd:
Pr [E[maxUJ] < E[maxUK]] (3.12a)
= Pr
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While the consumer is aware of their satisfaction, i, for each individual product, the analyst
is not. As a result, satisfaction is a random variable from the analysts perspective. I assume that
i  N [^i;  ] and denote 

; 2j{ as the cumulative distribution function of the Normal distri-
bution whose mean and variance are  and 2 respectively, evaluated at the point {. Notice that
i represents a random variable for each product, not each consideration set. While the random
is govern the form of the density function of the consideration sets, and therefore E[maxUK],
the is are product specic and represent random variables across individual choices, assuming
they are i.i.d. If the distribution of the consideration set, or E[maxUK], were driven by a specic
error term associated with a particular consideration set, the error terms would not be considered
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independent from one another. Consider the hypothetical error term associated with the Kth and
Jth consideration sets eK and eJ respectively. If K < J then K  J which necessarily implies that
the error term associated with the Jth consideration set, eJ , is a function of eK . In other words,
associating an error component with a consideration set implies that the error would increase as the
number of products in the consideration set increases. To avoid this, I follow Mehta, Rajiv, and
Srinivasan (2003) and recognize the analysts inability to perfectly observe the consumers satisfac-
tion for individual products. Assuming i is a normally distributed random variable also accounts
for di¤erent product specic satisfaction ratings across consumers. Accounting for consumer hetero-
geneity within the satisfaction parameters, i, is particularly important as they serve a critical role
in determining which products are purchased, as well as the composition of the chosen consideration
set. I address how the Normality of the is are incorporated into the purchase decision in the next
section.
With the assumption that the is are Normally distributed the density function of
Pr [E[maxUJ] < E[maxUK]] is Normally distributed with a mean and variance given by: J =PJ
i=1 ^i  AJ
PK
i=1 ^i and 
2
J = 
2


J +K (AJ)
2

respectively, where AJ and {J are dened as:
AJ =

K  [K   ]  [J ]
J [K]  [J   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 1
(3.13)
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Knowing the density of Pr [E[maxUJ] < E[maxUK]] I can invoke the extreme value theorem to nd
the probability that the Kth consideration set provides the highest expected maximum (indirect)
utility:
Pr [K = K] (3.15a)
= Pr [E[maxUK] > E[maxU1]] \    \ Pr [E[maxUK] > E[maxUN]]
=
NY
i=1


i; 
2
ij{i

: (3.15b)
The probability expression given in equation (3.15b) describes the probability that the Kth available
consideration set is the one that yields the highest expected maximum utility, E[maxUK]. It is
assumed that individuals knows their satisfaction for each product, i, and search to resolve their
uncertainty surrounding product attributes. Therefore, when selecting the optimal consideration
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set, each consumer calculates the expected maximum utility with precision. The analyst, on the
other hand, does not directly observe individual product satisfaction, so i are random variables that
drive the shape of the density function Pr [E[maxUK] > E[maxU1]] and the subsequent cumulative
distribution function 

; 2j{. The analyst, therefore, is only able to describe the probability
that an individual consideration set is optimal, which leads to equation (3.15b) above.
3.2.3 Purchase Selection
After the optimal consideration set K is chosen, consumers pay the cost of search and
observe product attributes and prices. Once consumers observe prices and attributes, they choose
the optimal quantity of each good based on the solution to equation (3.6) in which prices and
attributes are known. The researcher, on the other hand, is still uncertain about the true attributes
for the products in the consideration set. The attributes i are random variables from the analysts
perspective and are assumed Gumbel distributed. Therefore, the researcher observes the consumers
purchases that solve the following conditional rst order conditions (FOCs):
ei+i (qi + i)
 1   pi = 0 if qi > 0 8i 2 K (3.16a)
ei+i (qi + i)
 1   pi < 0 if qi = 0 8i 2 K (3.16b)
y  
KX
i=1
ci =
IX
i=1
piq

i : (3.16c)
Only K   1 of the above equations need to be solved because the optimal quantity for one of the
goods is automatically determined from the budget constraint in equation (3.16b) as search costs
are assumed spent. Therefore, I solve for i in terms of the specic product, whose optimal quantity
purchased is determined from the budget constraint. The conditional FOCs given in equations (3.16)
can be re-written, after taking logarithms, as:
Wi + i = W1 + 1 if qi > 0 8i 2 K (3.17a)
Wi + i < W1 + 1 if qi = 0 8i 2 K; where (3.17b)
Wi = i + ln+ (  1) ln [qi + i]  ln pi; 8i (3.17c)
where i = 
|xi and xi are product specic observations that help characterize each products
attributes. For expositional purposes let i = 1 represent the product that is always purchased.
Similar to Bhat (2005, 2008) I cannot identify a constant term for one of the products because only
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di¤erences between Wi and W1 matter.7 Consequently the constant in  that corresponds to the
rst product is omitted. The denition of Wi requires i > 0 8i and  to be between 0 and 1. As a
result, i is estimated as exp[i] while  is estimated as exp[]= (1 + exp[]).
Dene the optimal bundle of goods purchased as q = fq1 ; q2 ;    ; qI ; 0;    ; 0g. Following
Wales and Woodland (1983), and assuming that the is are independent of xi, the probability that
the bundle q is purchased is:
Pr[qj1;K] =

jJj
IQ
i=2
g (W1  Wi + 1)
"
KQ
j=I+1
G (W1  Wi + 1)
#
(3.18)
=

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 (W1 Wi+1)

where jJj is the determinant of the Jacobian term whose elements are given by:
Jih =
@(W1  Wi+1 + 1)
@qh+1
; i; h = 1; :::; I   1) (3.19)
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The probability that q is purchased, conditional on K, which is derived in the appendix of Bhat
(2005), is:
Pr[qjK] = jJj
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eWi W1
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i=1 e
Wi
I ; (3.20)
where p1 is the price of the outside option.
If search were assumed costless then Pr[qjK] = Pr[q] and K would be N , the total number
of products available. Recognizing that consumers will incur some kind of cost to acquire product
specic information, the conditional probability expression above is conditional on the subset of
7See Honka (2013) for a method on obtaining the parameter estimate for every product when the
consideration set is observed.
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products K  N, which is often unobserved. If the analyst was able to observe the consideration
set, thenK would be known and equation (3.20) could be estimated as an unconditional probability
expression where the term
PK
i=1e
Wi is dened over the i = 1; :::;K products in the consideration set.
A number of studies assume the consideration set is observed, so di¤erences between xed-sample
size and sequential search strategies can be investigated (de los Santos, Hortacsu, and Wildenbeest
2012; and Honka 2013). However, precisely observing which products a consumer considered before
making a purchase is usually the exception rather than the rule. Often, only the nal purchase
outcome is available, which is the case with the ice cream data.
The probability expression above is implicitly conditional on i  N [^i;  ] because it is con-
ditional on K. As Bhat (2008) points out, it is straightforward to incorporate the error the analyst
makes in observing the consumers product satisfaction i through the use of mixing distributions.
In particular, I decompose the error term i into two separate components i and i. The rst term i
captures the error made observing the product attributes and is i.i.d. standard Gumbel distributed.
The second component i, captures the error associated with observing product satisfaction, i, and
is Normally distributed. The unconditional probability that the bundle of goods q is purchased
from within the optimal consideration set K is given by:
Pr[q] =
Z

X
K

Pr[qjK] Pr [K = K]

d; (3.21)
where > = f1; :::; Kg and  is the cumulative Normal distribution. The conditional probability
expression Pr[qjK] is given in equation (3.21) and Pr [K = K] is dened in (3.15b). The probability
expression above is analogous to Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan (2003) except the probability that
the bundle of goods q is purchased instead of the probability that an individual good is selected.
The term Wi is dened as Wi = i + ln

pi
+ (  1) ln [qi + i] ; 8i 2 N and is derived in equation
(3.17c) above.
3.3 Estimation
I estimate the search-demand model given in equation (3.21) using simulated maximum like-
lihood. Given there is no closed form solution to the probability expression, simulated maximum
likelihood will provide consistent parameter estimates. To obtain starting values for the ice cream
application, I rst estimate equation (3.21) assuming K = N (Pr[qjK = N]), or that consumers
49
have no search cost and search across all products. Random numbers are generated for the starting
values of Pr[qjK = N] and the model is estimated 100 times. The average parameter estimates
from the 100 runs are then averaged and used as the starting values to estimate Pr[qjK = N] one
last time. The results of this model are then used as the starting values for equation (3.21).
The search-demand model also requires observing the households income. Since I cannot
observe their income perfectly, I approximate it as y^ = p|q+k, where p and q are the observed
prices, and quantities purchased, respectively and k is a constant that is explained in more detail
below. To be consistent with my derivation above, search costs should be added to the estimate of
income, as well as the total spent on the goods. The rst term in the expected maximum utility
given in equation (3.10) shows:
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where y = p|q+
P
k2J
ck
p is substituted in for the estimate of income in equation (3.22b) and search
costs drop out. I estimate the model for both denitions of income given in equations (3.22) above.
For equation (3.22a) the expression inside the parentheses must be great than zero because  < 1.
The constant k is dened such that it is su¢ ciently large to guarantee y^p +
P
k2J
n
k   ckp
o
> 0.8
The cost of searching across the prices and product attributes of di¤erent brands, ck, is the
cost incurred by a consumer to ascertain prices and product information of a particular product on
a given purchase occasion. The search cost captures a range of costs the consumer may have related
to search, such as the time spent searching, the physical cost of searching, or the mental cost of
retaining price and product information. As any of these costs increase for a particular product,
so does the search cost associated with the product. Since these costs cannot be observed directly
from purchase level data, I follow the convention and estimate them as ck = X where  is a vector
of parameters to be estimated, and X is a matrix of variables. Specically, X is the brand-specic
variance of prices, brand loyalty, number of products available in the market, the square of the
number of products available, household income, and the variance of prices at the market level. The
8We set k = 1000.
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brand-specic price variance is measured as the variance of prices for each particular brand across
all retailers within the market the consumer shopped. Since Stigler (1961) a rich body of research
exists that argues there is a direct relationship between the dispersion of prices in the market and the
cost of search. Brand loyalty is dened as 1 if the brand was purchased in the previous period, and
0 otherwise (Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan 2003). The number of products available in the market
may help reduce consumers search cost (Koelemeijer and Oppewal 1999; Boatwright and Nunes
2001; Borle, Boatwright, Nunes, and Shmueli 2005; Oppewal and Koelemeijer 2005; Richards and
Hamilton 2006; Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox 2009). However, studies have also shown that too
many products can overwhelm a consumer and deter him from making a purchase at all (Iyengar
and Lepper 2000; Chernev 2003; Shah and Wolford 2007; and Mogilner, Rudnick, and Iyengar 2008),
so I include the number of products squared to allow for a non-linear relationship. An individuals
income represents their opportunity cost of time, so higher income increases the cost of search.
Finally, the variance in prices at the market level is also included. This is measured as the variance
across all products in the area the household was observed making a purchase. I follow Andrews
and Srinivasan (1995) and Bronnenberg and Vanhonacker (1996) and eliminate the intercept term
from the denition of search as they cannot be separately identied from k.
9
3.4 Monte Carlo Experiment
In this section, I describe a Monte Carlo simulation experiment that is designed to asses the
performance of the proposed model, and to determine the nature and extent of any bias associated
with assuming search is costless. In particular, I want to ensure that my estimation algorithms are
able to recover the true parameters used for the data generating process. I also want to see how
accurate the proposed model is at predicting the correct consideration set.
I use a simplied version of the model developed above for the Monte Carlo experiment.
Namely, I simulate 1000 observations of data, and N = 8 choices. Consumer utility is dened
according to equation (3.1) above with:
i = ^i1 + ^i2xit + i; (3.23)
9See Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan (2003) for a discussion and an alternative approach.
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where ^i1 are choice specic intercept terms, and ^i2 is a choice specic parameter on xij which
varies over choice and time and follows a uniform distribution. The analyst observes xit but not ^i2.
Prices are generated following the exponent of a uniform distribution to ensure they are all positive.
They are then rounded to 2 decimal places. Search costs are generated by starting at 4 and adding
the absolute value of a normal distribution whose mean is 0 and variance is 10. A large variance
is used to ensure there are both positive and negative Gi values. Search costs vary over time and
choice and are not assumed to be the same for each simulated product search decision. For the i = 1
good, price is normalized to 1 and search costs to 0 for all observations. Additionally, 1 = i and
income is xed at $100.
A consumer determines the optimal consideration set based on their expected maximum
utility dened in equation (3.9b). The consumers price expectation is dened as the mean of the
randomly generated prices. The parameter k is the same over all t but di¤ers across prices. The
true k form the mean of the randomly generated error term i, with standard deviation  = 1,
so i = i + i where i is standard Normal distributed. i is distributed according to the standard
Gumbel distribution.
The consumer determines which products to include in the consideration set based on the
cost of search ck which varies over product and time. At each simulated purchase observation the
products are ordered according to 1   c1p  2   c2p      N   cNp . The expected maximum
utility is calculated for all N choices, and the optimal consideration set, K, is the one that provides
the highest E[maxUK] at each time period, or simulated purchase observation. The consideration
set K is then a matrix of 1s if the product is searched and 0s otherwise.
The constrained maximum utility problem described in equation (3.3) above for the more
general case when attributes and prices are observed is summarized as:
max
X
i
ei (qi + i)

sub. to ~y  
KX
i=1
piqi = 0 (3.24)
qi  0:
Since the consumer has already undertaken search the error term e"i is no longer present and he
knows all the searched products attributes, including price. The FOCs are:
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ei (qi + i)
 1   pi  0; (3.25a)
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qi
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ei (qi + 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 1   pi

= 0; (3.25b)
~y  
KX
i=1
piq

i = 0; (3.25c)
qi  0 (3.25d)
for all i goods, where i = ^i1 + ^i2xit + i + i and i and i represent the error the analyst
observes in i and i respectively. Notice that the budget constraint is satised for all K goods and
is not restricted over only those purchased goods. I partition the set of searched goods K into a set
of purchased goods I and non purchased goods F such that I \ F = ? and I [ F = K. Equation
(3.25b) is satised if, and only if, the marginal utility given in equation (3.25a) is 0 and qi > 0 or,
less than 0 and qi > 0. Therefore, all the purchased goods, I, satisfy equation (3.25a) with equality
and all the non-purchased goods, F; satisfy the equation with strict inequality. In other words, the
KKT conditions given in equations (3.25) (or equivalently the equations 3.5) can be summarized
as the price normalized marginal utility of all the purchased goods is equal to any other purchased
good, and is greater than all non-purchased goods.
Given the equality for the purchased goods in I I solve for the analytical solution to the ith
good using the ratio of Li and Lj and the budget constraint given in equation (A.2c). I have:
qi =
~y +
PI
k=1 pkkPI
k=1 pk

pi exp[k]
pk exp[i]
$   i; 8i 2 I: (3.26)
A key point regarding equation (3.26) above is that it does not hold for goods that are not purchased
(the goods in F) and it is conditional on the set of goods I, or more to the point, their parameters.
The specic way in which consumers choose the number of products, and their optimal quantities,
is described in detail by Pinjari and Bhat (2009). To summarize: First, consider the consumers
baseline marginal utility, or the marginal utility when qi = 0 which is

pi
ei 1i . Consumers will
choose products to consider for purchase such that p1 e
1 11      pK eK
 1
K (see Pinjari and
Bhat 2009 for the proof). Additionally, when qi = 0 the price normalized marginal utility is less
than , or pi e
i 1i < 
. Since the consumer knows all the parameters under consideration
except for  the consumer calculates  for I = 1, say 1; by calculating q

1 from equation (3.26).53
If p2 e
2 12  1 then the consumer computes the solution to q1 and q2 to nd 2. This process
continues until pI+1 e
I+1 1I+1 < 

I ; at which point consumption is set to 0 for the remainingK I+1
goods. The quantity of the I consumed goods is calculated from equation (3.26) above. I is dened
as:
I =

pi
ei (qi + i)
 1
; (3.27a)
where ~y is the consumers remaining income after search costs have been spent. I is calculated for
all possible I such that 1  I  N and should be the same for any product i used to calculate it,
so I use q1 as it is assumed always purchased. I represents the total number of products purchased.
However, if the error term is simulated and added to the expression, as it is here, then I may vary
across i 6= j choices.
The analyst observes the product attributes and the quantities the consumer purchased, but
does not observe the products that were searched, K. I then estimate consumer search-and-demand
as in the ice cream example described above.
3.5 Data Description
The empirical estimation requires household purchase information. I use Nielsens Homescan
data for ice cream which measures household purchases on a daily basis. Homescan consists of a
panel of consumers that are selected to be demographically and geographically representative. Par-
ticipating households submit all food purchase information each time they visit any type of retail
food outlet. The data consists of detailed demographic information from all the members of the
household and product specic information regarding the purchases they make. Demographic vari-
ables include age, employment, education, and income while purchase specic information includes
such things as the brand, price, unit size, and quantities purchased. However, product reporting takes
place in the home so items bought and immediately consumed may not be recorded. Additionally,
households that are generally hard to recruit (i.e. extremely high or low income households) may
be under-represented. Nevertheless the Homescan data, in general, has been found to be at least as
accurate as other commonly used (government-collected) economic data sets (Einav, Leibtag, and
Nevo 2008). The Homescan data includes purchases by 38,856 households of which 8; 268 made at
least one purchase in the ice cream category and resided in the markets I am considering.
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Ice cream is an ideal product category to study. Unlike liquid detergent and ketchup, which
many search studies use (Siddarth, Bucklin, and Morrison 1995; Andrews and Srinivasan 1995; Bron-
nenberg and Vanhonacker 1996; Chiang, Chib, and Narasimhan 1999; and Mehta, Rajiv, Srinivasan
2003), ice cream has a wide range of brands, avors, and carton sizes and multiple items are regularly
purchased. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 give frequency information for the number of brands the households
selected and the number of cartons of ice cream purchased in a single shopping trip, respectively. The
results of table 3.1 suggest that a standard discrete choice model would immediately exclude over
20% of the households purchases due to multiple brand purchases. Additionally, the data in table
3.2 demonstrates that assuming households make only a single purchase on a single shopping trip
would be an inaccurate assumption for almost 40% of the observed household purchase occasions.
My dataset consists of daily purchases throughout 2007 and 2008, which is long enough to observe
several category purchases, while short enough to assume consumers preferences remain stable.
Table 3.1
Frequency of Multiple Brand Purchases of Ice Cream for 2007 and 2008.
Number of Brand Purchases Frequency Percent
1 651241 77.7941
2 152234 18.1851
3 22874 2.7324
4 7768 0.9279
5 1763 0.2106
6 783 0.0935
7 255 0.0304
8 147 0.0175
9 69 0.0082
N = 837; 134
This is for the full dataset with outliers (greater than 9) removed.
Calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC
To reduce estimation time, I use the 19most frequently purchased brands/avor combinations
for the analysis. Here, I dene a specic consumer choice at the brand-avor level. For example,
Ben & Jerrys Vanilla would be a separate choice from Ben & Jerrys Chocolate. These 19 brands
account for about 40% of the total purchases made from a total of 347 brand/avor combinations.
Due to contractual obligations I cannot display the actual brand names and avors used in the
analysis. However, the three most frequently purchased products were all Vanilla avored. The
summary statistics of the specic brand/avor combinations used in the analysis are reported in
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table 3.3. The fact that ice cream is a di¤erentiated food category is evident in the variability of
prices among products. Interestingly, all of the products seem to follow a similar pricing strategy in
that the minimum and maximum prices are quite di¤erent, and the standard deviation and average
prices are reasonably close. However the purchase frequency di¤ers signicantly among products.
From table 3.3 I see that 21.1% of all the households purchases were for Choice 1 and drops to 8.1%
for the next most frequently purchased product. This suggests that even though the products follow
similar pricing strategies, the purchase frequency among products di¤ers signicantly. Honoré and
Kyriazidou (2000) show that at least four purchase occasions are enough to identify the parameters
of a mixed logit model. Therefore, I include only those households that made at least 4 purchases
so my nal sample consists of 1; 137 households and 8; 028 purchase occasions.
One of the limitations of the Nielsen Homescan data is that the product and pricing infor-
mation is only available for the purchased item. So, there is no information on the other options
that were available to the consumer at the time of purchase. To obtain accurate price and product
information of the full spectrum of options available, I combine the Homescan data with IRIs Sym-
phony Infoscan retail scanner data. The store-level scanner data contains weekly sales information
at the UPC level for almost 10,000 retail outlets in nearly 3500 cities throughout the U.S. The data
consist of dollar sales, unit volume (ounces), and product specic identiers. Covering all the cities
would have been intractable so I focus on ve major markets: Chicago, IL; Los Angeles, CA; New
York, NY; Atlanta, GA; and Philadelphia, PA. Infoscan data is necessary to obtain accurate infor-
mation on retail price information for all other products o¤ered in the store that the household opted
to not purchase. Following previous studies that combine store-level scanner data and household
purchases, I merge the two datasets together based on the households geographic location and the
store they visited (Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox 2008; and Zhang, Gangwar, Seetharaman 2008).
Specically, the household-level purchase data provides information on the households location via
their zip code and the retail outlet visited. On the other hand, the retail-level sales data provides
the sales of specic stores and their respective chain association. While the same chain store can
have several di¤erent outlets in a single zip code, it is reasonable to assume that the prices across
stores are maintained at least at the zip code level. By merging the data I accurately observe the
number of purchases made on each purchase occasion as well as the price information for all other
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options in the store. When I calculate the variance of prices at the brand/avor level I do so within
markets and across all retailers. Because the Infoscan data has price and product information for a
number of stores in the same area, I am able to get accurate price dispersion information, as well as
the total number of products that were being sold at the time the consumer made their purchase.
Table 3.2
Frequency of the Number of Units of Ice Cream Purchased for 2007 and 2008.
Number of Carton Purchases Frequency Percent
1 518162 61.8971
2 243556 29.0940
3 40692 4.8608
4 22188 2.6504
5 4798 0.5731
6 3715 0.4437
7 914 0.1091
8 1077 0.1286
9 357 0.0426
10 1018 0.1216
11 201 0.0240
12 237 0.0283
13 66 0.0078
14 50 0.0059
15 39 0.0046
16 38 0.0045
17 12 0.0014
18 22 0.0026
19 9 0.0010
20 27 0.0032
21 11 0.0013
22 21 0.0025
N = 837; 134
This is for the full dataset with outliers (greater than 23) removed
Calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC
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Table 3.3
Ice Cream Summary Statistics for 2007 and 2008.
Price Statistics (Cents per Ounce) Purchase Freq.
Brand/Flavor Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1 0.6650 2.0389 1.2603 0.2557 0.2114 0.4083
2 0.6096 1.9633 1.2533 0.3221 0.0812 0.2732
3 0.6611 2.0846 1.3201 0.2935 0.0836 0.2768
4 0.5732 2.0767 1.2815 0.3353 0.0713 0.2573
5 0.7063 1.9633 1.3110 0.2774 0.0521 0.2222
6 0.5628 2.0767 1.3075 0.2976 0.0519 0.2219
7 0.4851 1.9664 1.2391 0.3238 0.0577 0.2331
8 0.4020 1.9633 1.3096 0.2857 0.0472 0.2121
9 0.6572 1.9633 1.2400 0.3147 0.0476 0.2129
10 0.4287 1.9633 1.2505 0.3223 0.0487 0.2153
11 0.7022 1.9835 1.2997 0.2775 0.0460 0.2094
12 0.6382 2.0928 1.2925 0.3274 0.0466 0.2108
13 0.4133 1.9633 1.3073 0.2859 0.0446 0.2064
14 0.6195 1.9633 1.2483 0.3203 0.0455 0.2083
15 0.7122 1.9910 1.2947 0.2794 0.0411 0.1985
16 0.5948 2.0719 1.2669 0.3382 0.0387 0.1930
17 0.5885 1.9633 1.3072 0.2859 0.0412 0.1988
18 0.6250 1.9633 1.2502 0.3224 0.0372 0.1894
19 0.6376 2.1003 1.2843 0.3039 0.0371 0.1891
N = 8; 028
Calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC
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3.6 Results and Discussion
3.6.1 Monte Carlo Simulation Results
I start out by characterizing a few of the data patterns that were generated for di¤erent
parameter values. While the true parameter values chosen are provided in table 3.4, changing the
values around provide some clear insight as to how the data generated changed. In particular, as
the true value of  got closer to zero more products were searched and purchased, on average, as
expected. However, when  got close to 0, or less than about 0:3, it became di¢ cult for both models
to identify the i and  parameters. Because  < 0:30 implies a very strong preference for variety,
the generated data suggested all 8 choices would be searched, as expected, but that all, or almost all
(depending on how low  was set to) would be purchased with little variation between the optimal
quantities purchased over time. On the other hand, as  approached 1, or greater than about 0:7,
there was no parameter identication for either model. As  approaches 1 consumers have little
to no demand for variety and only search a set containing 1 product at almost every observation.
Because i has the largest parameter value for the rst good, and the search cost was set to 0, that
was the only good searched, and consequently purchased, at almost every observation. The data
generated, therefore, did not provide an adequate amount of information for either of the models
to be able to reasonably identify parameters. As expected, the percentage of the time each choice
was in a consideration set throughout the 1000 observations generated, was largely driven their
respective i parameters. Search costs varied signicantly across all but the rst choice so there was
some variation from one set of data to another, but over 1000 observations it was not signicant.
Table 3.4 shows the estimation results from both the model that recognizes search based on
equation (3.21) above, and a naive one that assumes search is costless based on equation (3.20)
where K = N in which search costs are assumed known. The results are based on the true 
equal to 0:6 in which about 5:8 of a possible 8 products are included in the consideration set and
1:8 products are purchased on average. For comparison purposes I estimate both models based on
 = 0:4 in which all 8 products are searched at every observation and an average of 2:7 products
are purchased.10 When every available choice was in the consideration set both modelsparameters
were very close to the true parameter estimates, as expected. The naive model that assumes every
10I found that  = 0:4 was about the highest value of  I could use that lead to generated data
in which all 8 products were searched.
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option was searched was less sensitive to the starting values used for i and  and had a low
standard deviation between parameter estimates over the 100 replications that were done. This is
not surprising since the maintained assumption of the model that ignores search is fullled at every
observation. However, as  increases and the severity of the maintained assumption is increasingly
inaccurate, the parameter estimates of the naive model becomes increasingly biased toward 0.
The results in table 3.4 conrm this bias for the naive model when  = 0:6. From an
intuitive perspective a bias toward 0 is expected. Since the naive model assumes every option is
considered, when in fact some are not, the model underestimates the importance of the products
that are not searched. The product attributes of the non-searched goods are not being weighed
against the searched productss attributes during the purchase decision, so assuming they are leads
to a negative bias (bias toward zero) among the parameters. The parameter estimates for the model
that recognizes search are less biased, and have a lower variance for the parameter estimates. This
is because the model has to determine which of the specic products the consumer searched. The
specic products searched critical a¤ects the denominator term
PK
i=1 e
Wi
I
(see equation 3.20)
when passed from Pr [K = K] to Pr[qjK] in equation (3.21). The more variation there is in W^i,
or ^i1 and ^i2, between the products actually searched and those estimated to have been searched,
the more di¢ culty there is in nding the true parameter estimates. This is increasingly true as the
number of products searched decreases ( increases). At the true parameter estimates the model
recognizing search costs does predict the correct consideration set well, with the majority of the
weight consistently given to the correct consideration set. With an average of almost 6 products being
searched at every observation the di¤erence between the estimated and actual products searched was
much smaller compared to the model that assumes every product was searched. An important note
here is that the estimated  critically a¤ects the number of products searched. The estimates
provided in table 3.4 use the true  = 0:6 value as the starting value. Because  critically a¤ects the
number of products searched, starting from the true , helped reduce estimation time and parameter
bias. I found that when  was started close to the extreme of 0 or 1 the variance in the estimated
parameters increased considerably and was likely to diverge to erroneous estimates, ^i1; ^i2  500
for example.
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Table 3.4
Parameter Estimates for Monte Carlo Experiment.
Search Model No-Search Model
True Value Parameter Std. Dev. Parameter Std. Dev.
 0.6 0.613 0.015 0.710 0.020
1 5.0 5.000 0.000 5.000 0.000
2 4.0 3.972 0.580 3.434 0.854
3 3.0 2.939 0.655 2.498 0.718
4 2.5 2.418 0.425 2.041 0.594
5 2.0 1.902 0.375 1.671 0.510
6 1.5 1.435 0.349 1.173 0.355
7 1.5 1.453 0.371 1.249 0.355
8 1.0 0.891 0.245 0.811 0.204
^21 -1.0 -1.387 0.150 -1.576 0.164
^31 -2.0 -2.567 0.154 -2.476 0.178
^41 -1.0 -1.536 0.171 -1.574 0.131
^51 -1.5 -2.028 0.123 -2.041 0.120
^61 -1.0 -1.547 0.188 -1.569 0.135
^71 -1.5 -1.997 0.153 -2.024 0.111
^81 -1.5 -2.016 0.115 -2.021 0.136
^22 1.5 1.242 0.170 1.229 0.241
^32 2.5 2.207 0.155 2.152 0.151
^42 1.5 1.230 0.230 1.247 0.191
^52 2.5 2.178 0.165 2.194 0.180
^62 1.5 1.283 0.211 1.233 0.204
^72 2.5 2.146 0.220 2.200 0.136
^82 2.5 2.154 0.159 2.203 0.218
Std. Dev. - Standard deviation across parameter estimates.
1 was held xed as it cannot be identied in the search model.
Based on 1000 observations and 100 parameter solutions
3.6.2 Ice Cream Results
In this section I present the demand estimates for equation (3.21) above under the conditions
of both costless, and costly search. Table 3.5 presents the results of both models that assume (1)
the full spectrum of products is considered and search costs are meaningless and, (2) consumers
incur a cost to obtain price and product information. As a rst step to interpreting the results I
compare both models to a naive counterpart in which the parameters are zero. Using the likelihood
ratio (LR) test, I reject the null hypothesis that the parameter vector from either of the models
is equal to zero based on the test statistics in table 3.5, which suggests that both have at least
some explanatory value in describing the demand for ice cream. In a similar fashion, I compare the
models to one another to determine whether or not search costs have any bearing on consumersice
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cream decisions. The null hypothesis that search costs are not important and consumers consider
all available ice cream options before making their nal selection is rejected based on the LR test
statistic 128:37 which is Chi-square distributed with 58 degrees of freedom. Therefore, I conclude
that households do face a cost of search that limits the size of their consideration set when selecting
ice cream products. So, I use the model that recognizes the importance of search costs to interpret
the parameter estimates.
There are a number of parameters that are of inherent interest from both a managerial and
theoretical perspective. First, the point estimates of the k parameters are all statistically di¤erent
from zero, and vary considerably. This rejects the linear utility structure employed in standard
discrete choice models. The statistical signicance and di¤erences across the k parameters suggests
that the linear utility structure used in other search-demand models is not exible enough to capture
the true nature of the households demand for goods, and by extension, may not represent an accurate
assumption when deriving the consideration set households choose. The signicance and variation
of the k parameters show that there are clear satiation e¤ects in ice cream purchase decisions. The
k parameters tell us the relative satiation households, on average, get from the products relative to
the outside option. The outside option is a very popular vanilla avor that was purchased far more
than any other good. Positive parameter estimates of k suggest that consumers become satiated
with that product faster than the outside option. Second, the parameter estimate of  0:81 implies
consumers have a relatively low preference for variety, on average tend to search a smaller number
of options than is available. However, there is some preference for variety among the sample of
consumers and so should not be ignored. These observations are consistent with the results in table
3.1.
Third, I nd that several of the discount interaction parameters are statistically signicant.
Positive parameter estimates suggest that those particular brand/avor combinations are highly
conducive to price promotions. Parameter estimates close to 0, on the other hand, imply that
promoting that particular brand/avor does not change the consumers propensity to purchase
the product. Fourth, the brand and avor specic intercept parameters can be thought of as a
baseline measure of how likely an individual is to purchase that particular product when no other
information is available. In other words, the brand and avor specic intercepts illustrate how
62
much utility a household obtains from a particular choice without having to consume the product.
Most of the intercept parameters being negative suggests that consumers nd the outside option
more favorable.11 This is consistent with the data as the outside option brand/avor was the one
purchased most often, and by the highest number of households, so presumably, that would be
the populations preferred brand. Finally, the market specic binary indicator variables control
for market specic e¤ects on the part of consumers and retailers/manufacturers. For example,
advertising low calorie ice cream in one market and high calorie ice cream in another. The fact
that these parameter estimates are statistically signicant and di¤er show that there are di¤erences
across markets which e¤ect the propensity of that population to make an ice cream purchase.
11Contract restrictions prohibit us stating what the outside option is.
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Table 3.5
Parameter Estimates for Structural Search Models.
Search Model Non-Search Model
Parameters Estimates t-stat Estimates t-stat
1 4.5509* 28.274 0.4977* 2.636
2 3.8424* 30.619 0.3364 1.515
3 3.8609* 37.315 0.2865 1.440
...
...
...
7 2.6049* 9.048 -1.5884 -1.162
8 3.1774* 20.66 -1.9867 -1.672
9 2.0373* 3.795 -2.7011 -0.319
 2.1845 1.160
Brand2 -2.4757* -6.421 -1.0589* -2.650
Brand3 -2.5823* -9.609 -1.0812* -3.754
Brand4 -0.2896* -0.696 -1.0298* -2.414
...
...
...
Flavor2 -0.2309* -0.704 -0.9673* -2.772
Flavor3 1.2478* 1.976 -0.9021 -1.503
Flavor4 3.2413* 14.145 -0.9509* -3.538
Disc*Price2 1.6088* 13.521 1.0134* 8.202
Disc*Price3 2.1475* 21.478 0.8905* 8.149
Disc*Price4 6.6648* 53.698 1.0970* 8.490
...
...
...
Disc*Price7 1.8770* 9.649 1.1037* 5.502
Disc*Price8 6.5285* 37.823 1.5940* 12.767
Disc*Price9 6.0557* 149.728 1.1800* 6.112
Market2 -10.9794* -38.400 1.0967* 3.619
Market3 -6.1013* -26.053 1.1222* 4.488
Market4 -13.7262* -58.573 1.1388* 4.614
Income -
BLoy -
Market Pr. Var. -
Num. Products -
(Num. Products)2 -
Log-Likelihood1 -458.12 -393.94
Likelihood Ratio
An asterisk indicates signicance at a 5.0% level.
... - Estimates omitted to save space
1
As Roberts and Lattin (1991) point out, there are signicant retention and cognitive process-
ing costs for frequently purchased goods that will limit the number of choices considered. My results
conrm this for ice cream and illustrate that consumers only search a subset of the total number of
products available. Therefore, when estimating the demand for ice cream, it is necessary to recog-
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nize the cost of search as consumers are likely to search only a subset of the products. Additionally,
demand for ice cream is inherently multi-discrete/continuous as products are often purchased in
multiple quantities, with at least 2 being purchased 20% of the time (see table 3.1). Prior demand
models that recognize the search of cost would have to ignore full 20% of the observed ice cream pur-
chases when estimating demand because they fundamentally assume a single product is purchased
(Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan 2003; Chiang, Chib, and Narasimhan, 1999; Koulayev 2010; Kim,
Albuqurque, and Bronnenberg 2010; de los Santos, Hortacsu, and Wildenbeest 2012; Honak 2013;
and Honka, and Chintagunta 2013). Estimating demand using only 80% of the observed purchase
data is likely to yield inaccurate parameter estimates, and importantly, incorrect consideration set
size predictions. Observing 2 products being purchased necessarily implies that consideration sets
containing only a single product cannot be possible. Ignoring every observation in which more
than 1 product is purchased will necessarily bias consideration set size estimates. Similarly, models
that recognize the multi-discrete/continuous nature of ice cream, but do not account for the cost of
search, or that consumers consider only a subset of the total available products, and are likely to
produce biased parameter estimates, as my Monte Carlo experiment suggests (Hendel 1999; Dubé
2004; Bhat 2005; Song, and Chintagunta 2007; Bhat 2008; Richards, Gómez, and Pofahl 2012; and
Bhat, Castro, and Pinjari 2012). The model developed in this paper is the only one (that I know
of) that is applicable to both multi-discrete/continuous purchase environments in which a subset of
the total available choices is considered.
3.7 Conclusion
Structural consumer search-demand models deal with situations in which only one alternative
is chosen from a set of mutually exclusive alternatives. However, many consumer demand situations
exist in which individualschoose multiple products in continuous quantities. Until recently there
has been little research on recognizing these multiple discrete situations in the context of consumer
search. This paper extends the single purchase search-demand models to formalize a structural model
of consumer search and multiple-continuous product purchases in a utility maximizing framework.
Specically, I extend Bhat (2005) in recognizing that people have a search cost which may limit the
number of products they actually consider before purchase. In addition, the structural model also
allows consumers preference for variety to inuence their search strategy, recognizing the value that
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more search has when an individual has a high preference for variety and may purchase multiple
products, making the gains from search that much higher. I assume a translated non-linear additive
utility specication that is derived through the addition of a multiplicative log-extreme value error
term which results in a closed form probability expression. Consumers determine the optimal con-
sideration set to choose based on their expected maximum utility, and then determine the number
and quantity of goods to purchase. My model is a static multiple discrete/continuous extension to
the consideration set formation model of Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan (2003).
I nd that search costs are important in a frequently-purchased consumer-good category. The
implications of this nding are important in that the actual number of brands a person will consider
before making a purchase will be less than the total number of choices available. My results suggest
that consumers search costs increase as their income increases due to the increased opportunity
cost of time and e¤ort spent searching. My empirical results also illustrate that the linear utility
assumption of classic discrete choice models is not exible enough is describing consumer demand,
which suggests that search models derived from these assumptions may not be fully generalizable
to all purchase contexts. My empirical model, on the other hand, is exible enough to describe
the search and purchase behavior in contexts of single, or multiple choice situations. Moreover,
the search behavior my model describes is exible enough to describe the optimal composition and
number of products in a consideration set, but simple enough to accommodate a large number of
options. In particular, unlike existing structural consideration set models, the combinatorial space
of the number of considerations sets increases linearly, rather than exponentially, with the number
of options available.
My ndings have a number of practical implications. First, my results show that it is im-
portant to take search costs into consideration even for common, frequently purchased household
products like ice cream. Roberts and Lattin (1991) argue that the cost of search in these categories
is driven more by mental maintenance and cognitive processing costs rather than nancial. My
results conrm that households do not take every single ice cream alternative into consideration
before making their nal purchase decision. Recognizing the importance of search, my model can be
applied by multi-product retailers to determine the products consumers consider before making a
purchase. By overcoming the curse of dimensionality the model developed in this chapter can read-
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ily accommodate categories in which a large number of alternatives are o¤ered. Using household
purchase data I show that it is possible to determine the consideration set consumers choose before
making a their nal purchase decision, so long as a reasonable measure of search costs is available.
Finally, the model provides retailers and manufacturers with valuable information regarding which
products consumers get the most satisfaction from, and alleviates the bias present in models that
assume search is costless and every alternative is considered. This model, therefore, provides a
valuable tool for both retailers and manufacturers alike.
As with any structural model, there are several limitations my model does not address. First,
it does not take into account quality uncertainty and assumes it known to the consumer before search
or purchase. This assumption could be relaxed if I were to allow for a dynamic updating of brand
quality learning over time. Second, Yuan and Han (2011) show that consumers price expectations
can have important implications for their search strategy. Incorporating price expectations into the
formation of the current consideration set is likely to provide valuable insight into a consumers
search behavior.
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CHAPTER 4.
CONSUMERS SEARCH AND THE CHOICE OVERLOAD HYPOTHESIS
4.1 Introduction
Consumers have heterogenous preferences for variety. Firms understand this observation and
introduce new products that are closely aligned with the demands of particular groups of consumers.
The results in a proliferation of choices that makes it di¢ cult for the average consumer to nd their
ideal product. The number of new product introductions in the food and beverage market increased
steadily from 1992 to 2007 (USDA-ERS 2013). However, from 2007 to 2008 the number decreased by
5% and then by a further 16% from 2008 to 2009. Surely, the recession is responsible for some of the
decline, but it appears to have accelerated a trend that was already well underway. Have consumers
reached their limit in their demand for variety? Consumers value deep assortments because they are
able to nd products that better meet their needs. Prots rise because larger assortments support
higher prices. On the other hand, many retailers have increased prots by reducing the number of
products on the shelf as consumers move toward familiar brands (USDA-ERS 2013). Contrary to
the common wisdom, many now support the idea that less variety is preferred (Iyengar and Lepper
2000; Chernev 2003; and Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang 2004), or that consumers have a nite
optimal number of alternatives (Kuksov and Villas-Boas 2010). The objective of this research is to
test these three competing ideas using experimental methods.
Experiments that consider the validity of the "choice overload hypothesis," or the notion that
too many options cause consumer dissatisfaction, have had mixed results.1 Through a number of
experiments, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) found that more consumers preferred smaller choice sets
compared to larger ones. Using unfamiliar products, for example exotic jams, Iyengar and Lepper
(2000) gave participants the option of choosing a product from either 6 or 24 choices and found that
consumers chose more often from the smaller set. In another experiment, Iyengar and Lepper (2000)
gave participants the option to choose from the larger or smaller assortment or the option to forego
making a selection at all and receive $1. They found that participants who were presented with
1There is no specic consensus on the term used to describe the phenomenon. We follow Iyengar
and Lepper (2000) (among others Diehl and Poynor 2007; Mogilner, Rudnick, and Iyengar 2008;
and Scheibehenne, Greifender, and Todd 2010). It has also been referred to as the "overchoice
e¤ect", "paradox of choice", "the tyranny of choice", or the "excessive-choice e¤ect" (Schwartz
2000; Schwartz 2004; Gourville and Soman 2005; Norwood 2006; and Arunachalam, Henneberry,
Lusk, and Norwood 2009).
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more options were more likely to choose the monetary compensation rather than make a selection.
Support for the choice overload hypothesis also lies in less exotic products such as pens, gift boxes,
and co¤ee (Chernev 2003; Shah and Wolford 2007; and Mogilner, Rudnick, and Iyengar 2008).
Arunachalam, Henneberry, Lusk, and Norwood (2009) conducted experiments very similar to those
of Iyengar and Lepper (2000) using a more common product, and found no evidence in favor of the
choice overload hypothesis. Clearly, the precise mechanism that leads consumers to choose fewer
products is unclear.
Others nd support for the more traditional notion that a consumers overall satisfaction
increases with variety. For example, Berger, Draganska, and Simonson (2007) use a number of
experiments to show that manufacturers introducing new products, even with only minor character-
istic di¤erences, are able to increase consumersperception of quality. Similarly, a number of eld
studies have shown that the probability of choosing a particular retailer to patronize increases with
the depth of assortment. That is, a larger variety o¤ered by a retailer provides a competitive advan-
tage (Koelemeijer and Oppewal 1999; Boatwright and Nunes 2001; Borle, Boatwright, Nunes, and
Shmueli 2005; Oppewal and Koelemeijer 2005; Richards and Hamilton 2006; Briesch, Chintagunta,
and Fox 2009). One of the reasons why this question has not been resolved is that there is no precise
denition for what constitutes a "large choice set" because the mechanism driving preference for
variety is unclear.
Di¤erences among purchase situations may dictate why the choice overload hypothesis is
prevalent in some situations, and not others. Through a meta-analytic review Scheibehenne, Greifeneder,
and Todd (2010, pg. 421) conclude that "...more choice is better with regard to consumption quan-
tity and if decision makers had well-dened preferences prior to choice..." They also suggest that
the choice overload hypothesis is likely to be more prevalent in situations where an individual is
unfamiliar with the choices, and has little or no preference for the specic choices at hand. The
choice overload hypothesis is more likely to apply when the consumer does not have a clear favorite
among the choices, or if there are many options in which no subset of them is clearly dominant.
Di¤erences among choice-specic situations may also be due to heterogenous search costs.
When search costs are high, as would be the case when an individual is unfamiliar with a product
category, the cost of searching a large number of options may deter choice. On the other hand, if
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someone is familiar with the products, then search costs are lower and a larger variety of di¤erentiated
goods may be preferable. Search costs, therefore, provide a more precise explanation as to why the
choice overload hypothesis is prevalent in certain cases and not others.
Search costs may explain why there is a nite optimal number of products desired. Norwood
(2006) develops an analytical model that explains the choice overload hypothesis as due to heteroge-
nous consumer search costs. He shows that it is possible for markets to provide too many options,
but argues that the lower revenue from losing customers due to too much variety will push variety
back down to an optimal level. Similarly, Cachon, Terwiesch, and Xu (2008) nd that as search
costs decrease and search intensity increases, the assortment of goods o¤ered by rms will increase,
leading to higher equilibrium prices. Firms are able to raise prices because the probability that their
products are searched, and purchased, increases. Recognizing the possibility that the number of
products o¤ered by the rm also a¤ects consumerspropensity to search, Kuksov and Villas-Boas
(2010) nd that consumers have an optimal preference for variety based on their search costs.
These analytical models explain why researchers nd support for the choice overload hypoth-
esis in experiments where the number of choices is exogenously chosen by the experimenter, but
eld studies nd that retailers gain a competitive advantage by o¤ering larger varieties. Namely,
in experimental studies the number of options is xed throughout the entire experiment and does
not change in response to participants choices. In contrast, retailers adjust the number of products
o¤ered over time based on consumersreactions and decrease the variety o¤ered if sales fall. Witness
the 2007 - 2009 experience of food and beverage manufacturers. That said, there is no empirical
evidence to support these analytical models.
This chapter contributes to the literature by testing the ability of consumer search to explain
the choice overload hypothesis. While numerous studies have tested the choice overload hypothesis
in di¤erent contexts, and for di¤erent product categories, none have explicitly tested the ability of
search costs to explain the phenomenon (Norwood 2006; and Kuksov and Villas-Boas 2010). The
results of my experiment provide strong support for consumer search costs to explain the choice
overload hypothesis. In particular, when search costs are low consumers want a wider range of
products to choose from which is consistent with the ndings of Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd
(2010) who nd that more products are preferred when preferences are well dened. In addition,
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this chapter contributes to the choice overload literature by conducting a non-hypothetical two
sided experiment that allows for retailer responses to consumers. There are no experimental tests
of the choice overload hypothesis, that I am aware of, that allow for retailersdynamic reactions to
consumers in adjusting the number of products they o¤er. Consistent with the theoretical model of
Norwood (2006) my results show that retailers respond to consumers choice decisions over time and
adjust the number of products o¤ered if too many or too few are leading to poor sales.
4.2 Market Experiment
In order to test the relationship between consumer search and variety, I develop a non-
hypothetical experiment that builds on the experimental design of Yuan and Han (2011).2 My
experimental design provides an equilibrium price, and an equilibrium variety, which are both de-
pendent on the buyersdecision to search.
One of the biggest challenges to studying consumer search is that search behavior and search
costs are often unobservable in both retail and household purchase data (Zwick, Rapoport, Lo, and
Muthukrishnan 2003). With household level purchase data the researcher can observe the products
that were purchased and detailed information about those products, but are often unaware of the
other products that were available to the consumer. Moreover, when there is a large number of
items available, it is unlikely that the consumer will consider every single one. Knowing which
products are considered, and which are not, is a critical element to the relationship between search
and variety. Therefore, I use an experimental approach so that the products considered and the
consumers search cost are clearly revealed.
I use a non-hypothetical experiment design in which the participants are rewarded based on
their performance within the experiment. Hypothetical experiments are often used to investigate
consumer search behavior, but participants in stated choice exercises have no real incentive to reveal
their true demand, nor to put cognitive e¤ort into the decision making process. Non-hypothetical
experiments, on the other hand, provide the participants with real economic incentives to make
decisions that provide the most benet at the lowest cost. For example, List and Gallet (2001) nd
that participants overstate their willingness to pay by 2-20% in hypothetical experiments compared
2The authors extend a debt of gratitude to Yuan and Han for sharing their ztree code.
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to non-hypothetical experiments. Consequently, I conduct a non-hypothetical experiment in which
I use real economic incentives to motivate participants to make realistic purchase decisions.
Experimental studies of consumer search are often built around the sequential search frame-
work that assumes products are considered one after the other, and a decision is made each time
to consider another option and incur a cost, or stop searching. For example, Zwick, Rapoport, Lo,
and Muthukrishnan (2003) conduct an experiment in which participants are shown an apartment
and then choose whether or not to view the next one, given some exogenously determined search
cost. As more and more apartments are viewed, the probability that the apartments seen earlier
are still available decreases. The choice overload hypothesis is more aligned with a xed-sample
size search process in which consumers are shown a number of di¤erent alternatives at the same
time, and then select a subset to consider. In addition, de los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest
(2012) test the applicability of the sequential search model against a xed-sample size alternative
using a combination of web browsing and purchase data. Online search data allows for a direct test
of the sequential versus the xed sample-size model as search behavior is directly observed. Their
analysis reveals that the pricing pattern across stores is inconsistent with a sequential search model
because higher prices do not induce a consumer to necessarily undertake search. Therefore, I use
a xed-sample size experimental design. A xed-sample design also allows for a more direct test of
how the number of products o¤ered e¤ects consumersdecision to search.
Participants were recruited from the general public as well as students from business classes
at Arizona State University. Using both public and student participants allows me to see whether
there are di¤erences between a student and public sample, and more generally, whether student
choices are representative of those made by subjects drawn from the general public. Participants
answered some basic demographic questions and were then randomly assigned to either a buyer or
seller role.3 Participants remained in their respective roles throughout the entire experiment. If a
participant was assigned to a buyer role, they chose which product to purchase and the quantity.
Participants in a seller role decided which products to o¤er and the prices to charge. Buyers and
sellers were also randomly matched to each other such that individual buyers did not know who
they were buying from, and sellers did not know who they were selling to. The aim of the random
3Demographic questions are available in Appendix D.
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matching protocol is to minimize or eliminate reputation e¤ects and collusion that could come into
play (Yuan and Han 2011; and Amaldoss and Rapoport 2005). Participants were informed that each
buyer would be randomly matched to a di¤erent seller each period.
Public participants were recruited by advertising the experiment on craigslist. The ad in-
formed potential participants that the experiment would take place on December 8, 2013 and 4 time
slots were available. Doodle.com was used to allow participants to sign up for individual time slots,
and showed participants whether or not a particular time slot was full. The rst experiment started
at 10:00am while the last session started at 4pm, each lasting approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes
which provided 30 minutes to pay the participants and get the experiment reset for the next session.
Public participants were paid $35 for coming to the experiment and a possible $15 or $10 bonus
depending on how much prot they accumulated compared to the others in the session. A total of
76 individuals participated in the public experiment, with only one individual dropping out of the
experiment half way through. Participants in each session were allowed to go at their own pace.
Once an hour and a half passed, the last period was nished and the experiment stopped. In one
of the four sessions, participants were only able to get through 3 periods after the initial practice
periods, so that entire session was excluded from the nal analysis.4 In the end there was a total of
48 participants, 35 of which were randomly selected to be buyers.
Students were recruited from business classes ranging from freshman to senior level under-
graduate classes. Students earned class credit for participating in the experiment and were not paid
solely for participating. They did, however, have the opportunity to earn an additional $10 or $15
bonus for attaining the highest prot at the end of the experiment. The top 2 sellers and top 2
buyers that had the most Economic Credits (EC) at the end of a session were paid an additional $15,
and from the remaining participants, the top 5 buyers and top 5 sellers were paid the $10 bonus. A
total of 48 students were recruited, of which, 32 were randomly selected to be buyers. In the nal
analysis, therefore, there were a total of 67 buyers and N = 1045 search/purchase observations.
At the beginning of the experiment, general instructions were given to the participants that
described how the experiment would work. This general information was followed by screen shots
4Since sellers had to wait for buyers to nish before moving on, and vice versa, there were several
individuals in this particular session that had a di¢ cult time moving forward, and this slowed
everyone down considerably.
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of each screen buyers and/or sellers would see, along with examples of how the inventory cost and
preference for variety bonus subtracted from, or added to, the total EC at the end of the game.
Participants then went through a practice round. At the end of the practice round, all participants
were asked if they understood how the experiment worked and their individual role as either a
buyer or seller. All questions that arose throughout the instructions, or the practice round, were
answered publicly. After all questions were answered and everyone publicly acknowledged that they
understood, each participant was again asked privately on their individual computer. Anyone that
privately answered "no" to one of these questions was removed from the nal analysis. Participants
were otherwise asked not to talk to one another nor sit near anyone they knew. The experiment was
carried out using the z-Tree software system (Fischbacher, 2007), which is an open-source software
tool that allows sellers to set prices, assigns sellers to buyers, and calculate prots.
4.2.1 Experiment Design
Sellers had the option of purchasing up to 5 di¤erent products, referred to in the experiment
as "Widgets," from the experimenter. Knowing the cost of each of the 5 available Widgets, sellers
chose the number of products to o¤er - at least 1 and at most 5 - and then set the price of each
product. The cost the sellers paid the experimenter for each Widget sold di¤ered. Namely, the base
cost for the cheapest Widget was 3EC. The base cost increased for each product by 1EC such that
the base cost of the 5th potential product, or most expensive, was 7EC. All sellers incurred the same
cost for each unit of a Widget sold, and no cost for unsold Widgets. In addition to unit cost of
each Widget sold, sellers paid the experimenter an inventory cost for each product o¤ered. The
inventory cost was determined randomly following a uniform distribution and di¤ered for each seller
and each period. The lowest possible inventory cost per Widget o¤ered was 1EC while the max. was
6EC. For example, if the sellers inventory cost was 2EC in a particular period, and the seller o¤ered
3 out of 5 total products, the seller paid the experimenter 6EC regardless of the number of products
sold. If the seller did not sell any products in a particular period their total prot decreased by the
inventory cost.
To avoid buyers and sellers repeatedly entering the same values for each period, I induced
price changes via the sellers Widget cost. All participants were informed that there would be price
changes periodically throughout the experiment, but did not know when. Buyers did not see the
74
prices sellers paid for the Widgets, and were, therefore, not aware which periods had price shocks.
After several periods had passed, the sellersWidget cost changed. These price changes were the
same for all sellers, and were added to (or subtracted from) the base price. In other words, if the
cost of the Widgets increased by 1EC it did so for all the sellers. Figure 4.1 provides an example
of the cost sellers paid for the most expensive Widget in two di¤erent sessions. The magnitude and
direction (either positive or negative) of the price changes were determined randomly following a
uniform distribution. The minimum price shock was set to 1EC and the maximum price shock was
3.5EC. In the event that the price shock was lower than -3EC the experimenter sold the cheapest
Widget for 0.01EC. In other words, the experimenter did not pay the sellers to sell the products.
Figure 4.1 illustrates how prices changes lasted for several periods and then moved back to the base
cost over several periods. The magnitude of the price changes was allowed to di¤er across products,
but were either all positive or all negative so that all products became cheaper or more expensive.
Thereafter, the prices sellers paid the experimenter for the products remained at the base cost for
several periods until another series of price shocks began.
Figure 4.1
The prices Sellers paid for the most expensive Widgets.
In each period, sellers observed the cost of each Widget and their inventory cost on the
same screen that they used to determine which products to o¤er and the prices. For the rst 6
periods (including the practice period) a conrmation screen came up that displayed their product
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and pricing choices and conrmed the sellers selection. If a mistake had been made, they had the
opportunity to go back and correct it, or conrm their original decision. The conrmation screen
was limited to 6 periods, which I found to be su¢ cient during pre-testing. Once all sellers had made
their nal product and pricing choices, the experiment moved to the buyers.
I incorporated search into the experiment following Yuan and Han (2011) by allowing buyers
to see the prices and products o¤ered by one seller for free, and then giving them the option to pay
a search cost and see another sellers products and prices. If the buyer decided to pay the search
cost, they could then purchase Widgets from both sellers. Search costs were determined randomly
following a uniform distribution and varied across buyers and periods. The minimum search cost
was set to 0 and the maximum search cost was set to 4EC. This search cost was paid out of the
buyers nal prot (or total EC) at the end of each period, and did not a¤ect the amount the buyer
had to spend on purchasing the products. In other words, if a buyer had a search cost of 3EC and
they decided to search, they still had 50EC to use to purchase Widgets from sellers. Once the buyer
made their search decision, his or her preference for variety was revealed.
Preference for variety was induced in a similar fashion as the sellersinventory cost, except
with each unique Widget purchased the buyer was able to increase their total prot. In this way,
I obtained an equilibrium number of products o¤ered. Sellers were aware buyers had a preference
for variety that would increase their prot, and that they would, therefore, prefer a wider product
selection. The degree to which the buyer preferred a wider product selection depended on the
magnitude of his or her preference for variety. Widgets of the same type from di¤erent sellers were
considered di¤erent. Preference for variety varied across buyers and periods and was determined
randomly following a uniform distribution. The minimum preference for variety bonus was set to 0,
while the maximum value attained was 3EC. At the same time preference for variety was revealed,
the buyer was able to make his or her product and quantity selections.
Buyers selected the number of unique Widgets to purchase and their quantity such that a
budget of 50EC was not exceeded. Buyers were alerted if their budget had been exceeded, but the
amount spent was not dynamically displayed as they entered values. Buyers sold the purchased
products to the experimenter with the aim of accumulating as many EC as possible each period.
Product di¤erentiation was induced by varying the value the experimenter paid for each Widget.
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Specically, the experimenter paid 10EC for the lowest valued Widget, 12EC for the second lowest
Widget, 14EC, 17EC, and nally 20EC for the highest valued Widget. The value of the products
were directly related to the sellers costs. For example, the experimenter sold the lowest valued
product to the seller for 3EC, and purchased it from the buyer at 10EC. Both buyers and sellers
knew the price the experimenter paid the buyers for the Widgets. These prices remained constant
for all buyers throughout the entire experiment. As with the sellers, the buyers saw a conrmation
screen for the rst 6 periods that allowed them to go back and re-submit their choices if they realized
they had made an error.
Once all buyers had made their nal decision, prots were tallied for all buyers and sellers
and displayed to each participant. Buyers observed the quantities they had selected, their search
cost, their prot in that period, and their total prot up through that period. Sellers observed the
prices they had set, the total quantities sold, their total inventory cost, prot for that period, and
their total prot up to that period. After the prot screen had been displayed the experiment moved
on to the next period, or ended if the time was up.
Once all sessions were nished, demographic data was collected using Qualtrics.com (available
in Appendix D), and was combined with the experiment data using randomly assigned subject ID
numbers.
In my experiment, sellers have an incentive to o¤er su¢ cient variety and low enough prices to
persuade prospective buyers not to search the other sellers product o¤erings, and absorb the entire
$50EC budget of each buyer. Buyers, on the other hand, determine whether or not to search the
additional sellers product and price o¤erings based on their cost of search and what the initial seller
o¤ered. A buyers decision to search, therefore, is a signal to the seller that the expected benet from
searching the additional sellers product and price o¤erings outweighed the cost of search.5 Sellers
did not know how many buyers purchased from them, nor who decided to search, and adjusted
their product and price decisions based on the units sold and prot made in the previous period.
In other words, the number of products and prices are endogenous to the buyers decisions in the
previous period. The data collected from the buyers provides information on their search decision,
as determined by their cost of search, the initial sellers product and price decision, and their
5Recall that at the time the decision to search is made buyers know they will have some positive
preference for variety, but do not know what it is.
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expectation about the other sellers o¤erings. Observing the buyerssearch decision, their search
cost, and the number of products o¤ered provides the information needed to test the relationship
between consumer search and preference for variety.
4.3 Empirical Model of Search Decision
I test the e¤ect a retailers variety decision has on a consumers propensity to search, while
controlling for their search cost. Specically, I test the implication of Kuksov and Villas-Boas (2010
pg. 517) that consumers have a nite, optimal number of products they will search. Support for
this hypothesis implies a non-linear relationship between the propensity to search and the number of
products o¤ered. Kuksov and Villas-Boas(2010) hypothesis is similar to the argument made for the
choice overload e¤ect. Namely, if search costs are indeed the moderating factor leading consumers
to prefer fewer items when products are unfamiliar and search costs are high, then I expect the same
non-linear relationship. On the other hand, if there is a strictly positive linear relationship between
search and variety, then I would reject the choice overload hypothesis in favor of the more usual
notion that consumers always prefer more variety to less.
I model the probability a consumer searches by extending the logistic regression model pro-
posed by Yuan and Han (2011). Specically, my model allows for consumer heterogeneity and
controls for the endogeneity in price and the number of products o¤ered. The indirect utility con-
sumer i obtains from searching at time t is the sum of a deterministic and stochastic part and is
written as:
Uit = 
|
zzi + 
|
xxit + "it (4.28)
where |zzi+
|
xxit is the deterministic component of utility, and "it is an independent and identically
distributed error term. The deterministic utility function is made up of a vector of consumer specic
attributes (zi) and a vector of search specic attributes (xit). Consumer-specic attributes are
demographic characteristics such as income and the number of individuals in the household, as well
as intrinsic preferences such as the desire to shop around, as opposed to quickly purchasing needed
items. Consumer-specic attributes also include a binary indicator variable that is equal to one
if the participant was in the public sample, and 0 if in the student sample. Including this binary
variable permits a test of whether there is a fundamental di¤erence between the public samples
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desire to search compared to the student sample. Search specic attributes, xit, include the price of
the goods at the time the search decision is made, the cost of search, and the number of products
o¤ered by the initial seller. The number of products squared is also included in the search specic
attributes to test for a non-linear relationship between search and the number of products o¤ered.
All estimated parameters are allowed to vary randomly over subjects, reecting heterogenous
preferences otherwise ignored by a xed parameter model (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995; Nevo
2001). I assume the parameters are normally distributed to allow for each e¤ect to be either positive
or negative. For example, I expect that as prices charged by the initial seller increase, buyers would
be more likely to search the other sellers product because the gains from search increase. However,
I do not want to impose this assumption a priori in order to test the specic relationship between
search and prices. Formally, I assume the parameters are normally distributed such that:
0B@ z
x
1CA = N
264
0B@ z
x
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0B@ z 0
0 z
1CA
375 (4.29)
where z, and x represent the mean of the parameters and z, and x capture consumer spe-
cic variations across parameters, or the standard deviation of the normally distributed parameter.
McFadden and Train (2000) interpret the elements of equation (4.29) as an error-component model
of attribute demand. Allowing the parameters to vary randomly not only accounts for consumer
heterogeneity, but also denes the utility from search as being correlated according to the attributes
of the decision at hand.
Given the indirect utility denition in equation (4.28) above, let uit1 = 
|
zzi1 + 
|
xxit1
represent the deterministic utility the consumer obtains from searching, and uit0 = 
|
zzi0 + 
|
xxit0
be the utility from not searching. The probability that a consumer decides to search is then given
by:
Pr
it
= Pr [uit1 + "it1 > uit0 + "it0] (4.30)
= Pr ["it0   "it1 < uit1   uit0]
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which is the cumulative distribution expression for "it0   "it1 evaluated at uit1   uit0. In order
to consistently estimate equation (4.30), I address the apparent endogeneity between the price and
number of product variables in uit.
Prices and variety are likely to be endogenous because the experiment is two-sided. Namely,
the prices and number of products o¤ered (or sellersdecisions) are based on the quantities sold
in the previous period which are determined by, among other factors, the search decision. So, the
total quantity a seller sells is a function of the error the buyers collectively make in determining
whether or not to search. As a result, the prices in the current period may be correlated with the
error in determining whether or not to search. I assume that the error an individual buyer makes is
independent over time. Therefore, I use an instrumental variable approach to control for endogeneity
in a model of the probability of search.
I use the control method approach (Petrin and Train 2010; Park and Gupta 2009), which is
based on the sample-selection models of Heckman (1978) and Hausman (1978). Using simulation,
Andrews and Ebbes (2013) show that when instrumental variables are available, the control function
approach performs better than competing methods of addressing endogeneity (Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes 1995; Park and Gupta 2009; Villas-Boas and Winer 1999) in estimating price elasticities.
Intuitively, the control function approach derives a proxy variable that conditions on the endogenous
part of the price variable, thus making the remaining variation independent of the error term. Then,
the standard simulated maximum likelihood approach will be consistent.
The utility that a consumer obtains from searching is a function of both exogenous and
endogenous variables. I partition the set of variables xit into a vector of exogenous variables, _xit,
and endogenous variables, fNit; (Nit)2 ; pitg>, where Nit is the number of products available to buyer
i at time t, and pit is the average price of the Nit products. The decision to search is made based
on the prices of the available products, the search cost, and other exogenous factors. So, the utility
of searching is given by:
Uit = 
|
zzi + 
|
_x _xit + NNit + N2 (Nit)
2
+  ppit + "it: (4.31)
Let it, and %it represent the errors associated with Nit, and pit, respectively, that is not independent
of "it. The average price of the o¤ered products, pit, is used instead of each actual price because not
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all products are o¤ered each period. As a result, price information for each individual product is
not available every period. Using the average price of all the o¤ered products at time t is similar to
assuming the response to price is the same for all the products (i.e. (pit1 +   + pitN )). While the
amount paid by the experimenter is di¤erent for di¤erent products, it remains constant throughout
the experiment and is well known by both buyers and sellers at the start of the experiment. So,
while the buyers may not be as sensitive to a price change for a product that they are paid more for,
sellers know this information as well, and would be expected to capitalize on it by setting slightly
higher prices for higher valued goods. The variation between product prices is likely to lead to very
similar, if not the same, price response for each product. Using the average price as a proxy for the
e¤ect prices have on the consumers decision to search helps avoid the lack of price information for
products that are not o¤ered in a particular period by normalizing the sum of prices by the number
of products that were o¤ered. Using the average price also helps alleviate the endogeneity associated
with each o¤ered product by normalizing it by the total number of products available in that period.
Following Petrin and Train (2010), I assume that observed and unobserved covariates Nit,
(Nit)
2
; and pit are additive, or ~it+it and ~%it+%it respectively. Let it and %it represent the parts
of Nit + (Nit)
2 and pit, respectively, that is correlated with the error term and ~it and ~%it are not.
I then decompose the error term associated with the decision to search, "it, into a general function
of the observed and unobserved covariates of the endogenous variables leading to:
"it = CF [it; %itj] + ~it + ~%it (4.32)
where CF [it; %itj] is the control function with parameter vector , and ~it, and ~%it are the error
components that are independent of "it. I approximate the control function as linear in ~it, and
~%it, or CF [it; %itj] = 1it + 2%it.6 The error terms it, and %it are recovered by, separately,
regressing Nit, and pit onto a set of instrumental variables.
The instrumental variables are the costs of each of the 5 available products as well as the
seller margins (Berto Villas-Boas 2007; Draganska and Klapper 2007). The instrumental variables
are intuitive determinants selling prices, and number of products chosen by the seller, but exogenous
6An interaction term was included, but provided little to no explanatory power, and had almost
no e¤ect on the parameter estimates of other variables so was excluded from the nal analysis.
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to an individual buyers search decision.7 I assume that the control function is normally distributed
and that ~it, and ~%it are dened such that ~it + ~%it is Type 1 extreme value (see Bertin and Clusel
(2006) for the distributional properties of ~it, and ~%it that lead to ~it+~%it being Gumbel distributed).
Combining the utility function given in equation (4.28) with the error term in equation (4.32),
indirect utility is written as:
Uit = 
|
zzi + 
|
xxit + 1it + 2%it +~it; (4.33)
where ~it = ~it + ~%it, and k s N(k; k) for k = 1; 2 similar to the parametric denitions given
in equation (4.29) above. Estimating the models sequentially in this way can cause a compounding
error problem (Cameron and Trivedi 2005; and Petrin and Train 2010). However, this is unlikely as
the estimated parameters are very similar to those found without the control function.8 Therefore,
I conclude that the compounding error problem is, at most, negligible.
Empirical consumer search studies commonly assume that "it is Type 1 Extreme Value dis-
tributed and, combined with the random parameter assumption, yields the familiar mixed logit
model. However, the Gumbel distribution requires all "it be independent across all choice situa-
tions. Therefore, I estimate the model twice. One estimation assumes that "it is Gumbel distributed
and another assumes "it is jointly normally distributed across all choice situations. The joint normal
distribution does not require an independence assumption, and generates a mixed Probit model.
The mixed Probit model can accommodate random taste variation, exible substitution patterns,
and is applicable to panel data with temporally correlated errors "it (Train 2009). In general, the
Gumbel distribution is nearly identical to the normal distribution except that is has slightly fatter
tails which allows for more aberrant behavior. Since there is no closed form for either the mixed
logit, or the mixed probit model, I use simulated maximum likelihood to estimate the probability
of search. Simulated maximum likelihood provides consistent parameter estimates under general
error assumptions and is readily able to accommodate complex structures regarding consumer het-
erogeneity. To aid in the speed and e¢ ciency of estimation, I use a Halton draw sequence. Bhat
7The quantities sold in the prior period are also likely candidates for instrumental variables, but
may not be exogenous, and so were not used.
8These results are available from the authors upon request.
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(2003) provides experimental evidence that suggests Halton sequences can reduce the number of
draws required to produce estimates at a given accuracy by a factor of 10. I found that R = 500
draws were more than su¢ cient to produce stable estimates.
4.4 Results and Discussion
In this section, I report the results obtained from tests of the main hypotheses of the paper,
specically how variety is related to the costs of search. Prior to presenting the parameter estimates
from the formal econometric search model, I rst present some summary statistics on the experi-
mental search data. Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for the participants in both the student
sample, and general-population sample that were selected to be "buyers" in the experiment. The
samples appear to be generally similar, although, not surprisingly, the average age of the student
sample is 22.5 years old, whereas that in the public sample is 35 years old. Moreover, the age range
is much wider in the public sample compared to the student sample. The only other notable di¤er-
ence across the samples is the frequency with which they made a purchase online, or had something
delivered to them that was purchased online. In this regard, students are more frequent online
purchasers than the general public
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Table 4.1
Experiment Summary Statistics.
Student Population Public Population
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Search Decision 0.59408 0.310798 0.54419 0.369638
Preference for Variety 1.52535 0.208929 1.45512 0.251891
Search Cost 1.91171 0.279027 1.95408 0.359910
Budget Not Spent 4.54842 3.848258 8.26910 10.212501
Number of Products Purchased 1.99567 0.754445 2.07573 0.773776
Number of Products o¤ered - Seller 1 2.69847 0.759002 3.52750 1.223511
Number of Products o¤ered - Seller 21 1.61208 1.018545 1.76451 1.499512
Total Products Observed 4.31055 1.288343 5.29201 1.868046
Age 22.56250 3.600515 35.11429 16.795958
% of Female 0.46875 - 0.40000 -
# in the Household 2.15625 1.547305 2.54286 1.596740
Income 8.09375 5.909857 7.71429 5.344439
Education 3.12500 0.941858 3.45714 1.291211
Analytical Bach. Degree 0.75000 - 0.05714 -
% with Job in AR/AP 0.31250 - 0.40000 -
$ spent on Groceries 4.03125 2.162501 4.00000 2.029199
% that favors Prod. o¤ered2 0.56250 - 0.28571 -
% that like shopping around3 0.40625 - 0.65714 -
Frequency of online purchases4 3.12500 1.263635 2.48571 1.245496
Frequency of delivered items4 3.06250 1.162242 2.31429 0.993255
Min. Max Min. Max
Search Decision 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Preference for Variety 1.169 2.061 0.742 2.014
Search Cost 1.371 2.651 0.960 2.534
Budget Not Spent 0.272 15.404 0.373 38.625
Number of Products Purchased 1.000 4.786 1.000 4.047
Number of Products o¤ered - Seller 1 1.556 4.462 1.227 5.000
Number of Products o¤ered - Seller 21 0.000 3.583 0.000 5.000
Total Products Observed 1.900 6.538 1.909 9.454
Age 18.000 32.000 19.000 71.000
# in the Household 1.000 6.000 1.000 6.000
Income 1.000 19.000 1.000 16.000
Education 1.000 5.000 1.000 6.000
$ spent on Groceries 2.000 9.000 1.000 9.000
Frequency of online purchases4 1.000 6.000 1.000 6.000
Frequency of delivered items4 1.000 6.000 1.000 4.000
H = 32 H = 35
The household statistics reported here are only for those participants who were selected
to be buyersin the experiment. Additionally, the average experiment variables are cal-
culated as the average per buyer, then average over the sample. So, the averages reported
here are not weighted by the number of periods each individual got through.
1 This is conditional on the buyerchoosing to search.
2 The participants had to choose whther price, or the products o¤ered was more impor-
tant when choosing a retailer.
3 The participants had to choose whether the preferred to obtain the items they came for
and leave, or shop around and look at di¤erent items o¤ered in a retailer.
4 1 - Never; 2 - Less than once a Month; 3 - Once a month; 4 - 2-3 times per month; 5 -
Once a week; 6 - 2-3 times a week; 7 - Daily. (No one chose 7).
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Within the experiment itself, buyers included in the estimation sample were similar in terms
of both the cost of searching and the preference for variety. However, sellers in the student population
o¤ered fewer products, on average, compared to the public sample. Namely, students initially had
an average of 2.7 products to choose from before searching while sellers in the public sample chose
to o¤er an average of 3.5 products.9 Despite this, the average number of products purchased by
buyers in both samples was very close to two products. So, even though buyers in the public
sample saw a higher number of products for free, and had the same preference for variety incentive
(not statistically di¤erent at the 5% level), the number of products purchased is consistent with
the number purchased in the student sample - 2 products. When making purchase decisions, the
public sample used their budget less e¢ ciently compared to the students. On average, the public
sample had 8.3EC remaining compared to 4.5EC for the student-sample. These di¤erences are
statistically signicant at the 6% level of signicance.10 Finally, the di¤erence between the two
di¤erent samples search cost and preference for variety are not statistically di¤erent. From Figure
4.2 below, the preference for variety and search costs do represent a uniform distribution reasonably
well. The histograms look almost identical if split across the di¤erent samples.
In addition to buyer information, I also have information pertaining to sellers. In particular,
I nd that seller prot and the number of products o¤ered are negatively correlated and statistically
signicant at the 1% level (N = 475). This relationship holds even when considering sellersgross
prot before inventory costs are subtracted, although it is no longer signicant. Therefore, even
though consumers had an incentive to purchase a wider range of products, even from di¤erent
sellers, sellers did not see this preference for variety reected in their prot. Consistent with Yuan
and Han (2011), there is a slightly positive correlation between price dispersion and search intensity
(0.06) but this is not statistically di¤erent from 0. So, my results do not appear to support Varian
(1980) in that the more consumers search, prices are less competitive and more variable. In contrast
to Yuan and Han (2011), I nd no correlation between buyer search intensity and seller prot.
Finally, I nd a negative correlation between search intensity and the buyers search cost ( 0:225)
9The mean is statistically di¤erent at the 1% level.
10If the individual purchase observations are used then the di¤erence between the average amount
of money that was not used across the two di¤erent samples is signicant at the 1% level (N = 1044).
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Figure 4.2
Histrogram of the Search Cost and Preference for Variety Observed by Buyers
as well as the number of products o¤ered ( 0:243), both of which are signicant at the 1% level. I
test these relationships more formally next.
The negative correlation between search intensity and the number of products o¤ered does
not take into account the degree to which prices may be driving the consumers decision to search.
If the buyers search cost is reasonably high, but the prices o¤ered by the seller are even higher, then
the correlation between searching and the cost of searching may be understated. In other words,
prices may be masking what is actually a stronger negative relationship between the buyers cost of
search and the decision to do so. Modeling the probability of search, as discussed above, accounts
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for these inter-correlations between the variables driving the consumers search decision as well as
any unobserved heterogeneity in the participants ability to solve the problem analytically.
I test whether unobserved heterogeneity is indeed important using the likelihood ratio (LR)
test. A LR test compares a model that assumes heterogeneity is not present to the model in (4.29).
The LR test statistic is 127:30 for the mixed logit model, and 77:87 for the mixed probit model, both
of which are Chi-square distributed and signicant at the 5% level. For either model, therefore, the
random parameter specication is preferred.11
The search model is estimated both as a mixed logit and a mixed probit. The results of both
are presented in table 4.2. From a qualitative perspective, the assumption that the error terms are
normally distributed versus Gumbel distributed does not seem to make a substantive di¤erence to
the conclusions of my hypothesis tests. Since the majority of empirical consumer search studies
use a Gumbel distribution assumption, I interpret the mixed logit results in order to maintain
comparability (Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan 2003; Wildenbeest 2011; and Yuan and Han 2011).
The results presented in table 4.2 summarize the relationship between the probability of
searching, and the factors a¤ecting that decision. Consistent with the current search literature, I
nd that the probability a consumer searches decreases with the cost of search (Mehta, Rajiv, and
Srinivasan 2003). Consistent with the experimental results of Yuan and Han (2011), I nd that
subjects are more likely to search when observed prices increase.12 In addition, I nd that excluding
the number of products o¤ered biases the coe¢ cient on price towards zero. Without considering
the number of products o¤ered, the results of the mixed logit model (left columns of table 4.2)
suggest that prices have less bearing on the consumers decision to search relative to when variety
is included.
The bias induced by excluding the retailers variety decision is not surprising given the im-
portance of variety to the subjects propensity to search. Based on the magnitude of the parameter
estimates reported in table 4.2, the number of products o¤ered by the retailer plays a more im-
portant role in guiding the consumers search decision compared to both the average price, or the
11The results of the xed parameter alternative are available from the authors upon request.
12Positive parameter estimates are also found on a model that estimates a di¤erent parameter for
each price.
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search cost (Kadiyali, Vilcassim, Chintagunta 1999; Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox 2009). As variety
increases, the probability the consumer decides to search decreases precisely as the seller intends.
Since the initial seller o¤ers a larger variety to persuade the buyer not to search the other seller, a
negative coe¢ cient is expected. Consistent with Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox (2009), my results
suggest that retailers can use variety as a competitive tool to keep consumers from shopping at other
retailers. Moreover, my results provide evidence that this relationship is non-linear.
The choice overload hypothesis states that too many options overwhelm consumers and can
lead to him avoiding making a purchase at all. Kuksov and Villas-Boas (2010) formalize the concept
underlying the choice overload hypothesis by explaining it in terms of consumer search costs. When
the cost of search is small, consumers prefer a wider choice set, and as the cost of search increases,
the demand for variety falls. I test this e¤ect directly as it relates to the consumers propensity to
search. The positive parameter estimate on (N1t)
2 is statistically di¤erent from 0 at the 5% level for
both the mixed logit and probit results, which provides support for the choice overload hypothesis.
More variety causes consumers to search more, thereby reducing the probability of actually making
a choice. Consistent with Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd (2010) the variance of the parameter
estimate is statistically di¤erent from 0; which implies that there is considerable heterogeneity among
consumers regarding the precise point at which the overload-e¤ect begins. Therefore, the results
of the mixed logit and probit models suggest that the choice overload hypothesis may have been
accurate for some, but not all, experiment participants. Perhaps more important, however, is the
comparison between the linear and non-linear parts of the search function. Some argue that retailers
use larger product assortments to attract consumers to the store (Koelemeijer and Oppewal 1999;
Boatwright and Nunes 2001; Borle, Boatwright, Nunes, and Shmueli 2005; Oppewal and Koelemeijer
2005; Richards and Hamilton 2006; and Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox 2009), while others nd
that consumers are put o¤ by too much variety (Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Chernev 2003; and
Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang 2004). I nd that search is a non-linear function of the number of
products o¤ered. In addition, the number of products o¤ered has a larger impact on the propensity
of an individual to search than either the search cost, or the prices. In other words, because
search is directly related to which store a participant chooses to patronize, and precedes purchase
and consumption, the non-linear relationship found here suggests there is an optimal number of
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products that could be o¤ered to get the consumer to avoid searching the other store. Because I
use an experimental setting that o¤ers participants, at most, 10 choices I do not compute through
simulation the precise number of products a consumer would want and leave that for future eld
studies.
My results also highlight the importance of considering the number of products sold by a
retailer in eld experiments. Prices, the cost of searching, and variety can all be used as competitive
tools by a retailer to persuade a consumer to shop only with them, but variety appears to be the
most important.
In addition to the cost of search and prices, I nd that there are a number of consumer specic
demographic attributes that play an important role in the consumers propensity to search. First,
the results in table 4.2 show that the public sample is considerably less likely to search compared
to the student sample. This is consistent with the probability of search reported in table 4.1. This
nding suggests that a student sample may not be representative of the actual search behavior of
the general public, because students are more likely to undertake search. Second, the consumers
revealed preference for variety in the previous period has no bearing on their decision to search in
the current period. This result is expected and shows that the participants understood that their
preference for variety was independent across periods.13 Third, male participants were much more
likely to undertake search compared to female participants. Fourth, in contrast to Bucklin (1969)
there is some evidence that as the participants income increases they are less likely to undertake
search. This is an interesting result because the consumers own income has no bearing on their prot
in the experiment. However, it is consistent with the notion that the most important component
of search costs is the opportunity cost of time. Fifth, the results suggest that consumer who spend
more on groceries are more likely to search across di¤erent retailers. Participantsmonthly grocery
bill should have no e¤ect on their decision to search, yet I nd evidence that consumers who have
a higher monthly grocery bill are more likely to search, perhaps because they perceive the expected
benet from search to be greater. Sixth, participants were asked whether they had a bachelors
13The current periods preference for variety was also found to not have any bearing on the
consumers propensity to undertake search in that period. Since the preference for variety was
revealed to them after they made the search decision, this result is expected.
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or advanced degree in business, or an analytical eld of study.14 The results suggest that more
technically-educated participants were less likely to undertake search.
Taken together, the results begin to answer the question of whether too much variety is
indeed a bad thing. I nd that the variety o¤ered by a retailer is a critical component of the
consumers decision to search. Variety not only has a larger impact on the consumers decision to
search compared to prices and the cost of search, its exclusion from the analysis actually biases the
results of those parameters. Therefore, it is critically important to take variety into consideration
when studying consumer search. Additionally, given the e¤ect of the number of products has on a
consumers decision to search, rms can increase variety when search costs fall, and maintain higher
prices to impede consumer search. This conrms the main hypothesis of Cachon, Terwiesch, and Xu
(2008). Consumer search studies often test the relationship between search and search costs using
a single purchase assumption (Kogut 1990; Sonnemans 1998; and Yuan and Han 2011). However,
as my results show, the results of these studies may not be applicable to situations in which the
consumer can observe multiple products at the same time. My results also show that consumers
have di¤ering intrinsic propensities to search that are not entirely due to observed heterogeneity, or
di¤erences in demographic background.
14In the student sample, freshman and sophmores were instructed to answer no to this question
unless they had already taken all their math requirements and had 2 business classes. Juniors and
Seniors will have fullled these requirements based on the schools curriculum and were instructed
to answer yes to the question.
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Table 4.2
Random Coe¢ cient Model Estimates.
Mixed Logit Mixed Logit Mixed Probit
Variable Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Constant -0.9071 -0.50 2.9620* 3.82 2.7874* 4.50
Public sample -1.2686* -5.11 -2.0919* -7.11 -1.7088* -7.35
Pref. for varietyt 1 0.0266 0.68 0.0518 0.63 0.0342 0.51
Female -0.6967* -6.08 -1.1148* -5.99 -0.7240* -4.91
# People in HH -0.2419* -2.95 -0.4193* -6.12 -0.3908* -6.89
Income -0.0688* -7.01 -0.0807* -4.76 -0.0797* -5.61
Education 0.1955* 6.99 0.1011 1.17 0.0256 0.36
Bachelors -1.1082 -1.07 -1.4374* -5.56 -1.4638* -6.81
Grocery costs 0.3455* 7.53 0.4047* 7.01 0.3609* 7.67
Ave. Price 0.3226* 2.13 0.3766* 7.83 0.2738* 7.65
Search Cost -0.5377* -7.31 -0.6576* -9.00 -0.5375* -9.16
NPO S1ty - - -1.2205* -3.66 -0.9375* -3.48
(NPO S1t)
2 - - 0.1205* 2.24 0.0870* 1.99
NPO S2t 1z - - -0.0687 -1.30 -0.0561 -1.38
p -0.0185 -0.74 -0.0185* -2.08 -0.0144* -2.07
N - - -0.1901 -1.22 -0.1624 -1.34
Std. Dev. Of Random Parameters
Female 0.0727 0.48 0.0727* 6.36 0.9729* 8.57
# People in HH 0.0665 1.75 0.0665 0.15 0.0418 1.75
Income 0.0201 1.89 0.0201* 6.00 0.0034 0.53
Education 0.3152* 9.09 0.3152* 4.55 0.0540* 2.86
Bachelors 0.2587 1.79 0.2587 0.49 0.0895 1.01
Grocery costs 0.0358 1.58 0.0358 1.47 0.0920* 5.75
Ave. Price 0.2230* 12.47 0.2230* 12.07 0.1589* 12.29
Search Cost 0.2643* 5.66 0.2643* 6.18 0.2368* 7.13
NPO S1ty - - 0.2785* 7.28 0.0696* 3.58
(NPO S1t)
2 - - 0.0861* 8.39 0.0669* 9.73
NPO S2t 1z - - 0.1199* 2.38 0.0310 1.16
p 0.0438* 6.87 0.0374* 5.39 0.0167* 4.51
N - - 0.1063 0.91 0.0320 0.49
Log-Likelihood -451.61 -432.43 -432.16
LR 243.81 228.11 232.11
LRI 0.2126 0.2170 0.2208
An asterisk indicates signicance at a 5.0
yNPO S1t - Number of products o¤ered by the seller the consumer sees for free at the
time the search decision is made.
z NPO S2t 1 - Number of products o¤ered by the searched seller in the previous pe-
riod, if the participant decided to search in the previous period.
4.5 Conclusion and Future Research
In this chapter I examine the relationship between consumer search and preference for variety
when consumers purchase multiple products in continuous quantities. I examine rms incentives
to o¤er a wider variety of products, and consider whether the "overload hypothesis," or whether
retailers can o¤er too much variety and deter consumers from purchasing.
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How consumers respond to the assortment o¤ered by a rm remains a debate. While many
studies nd that variety is valued by consumers, and can be used to attract them, others nd that
too many options leads to consumer dissatisfaction and the avoidance of a purchase (choice overload
hypothesis). This study bridges these competing schools of thought using experimental methods.
I use a two-sided experiment in which participants use the number of products, prices, and
search costs to determine whether or not to search, while knowing that they will have some pos-
itive preference for variety that will motivate them to purchase multiple ctitious products. The
experiment is conducted on both undergraduate college students and the general public.
My results support the theoretical models of Norwood (2006) and Kuksov and Villas-Boas
(2010) who suggest that consumer search explains the choice overload hypothesis. I nd that the
factors a¤ecting the propensity to search can explain both the notion that more variety is better,
but too much variety can be a bad thing from a retailers perspective. In particular, I nd that
consumer search is a non-linear function of variety. My results also illustrate the importance of
taking variety into account in future consumer search studies as excluding variety results in serious
estimation bias.
The results have a number of managerial implications for retailers. In particular, retailers
can increase the assortment available to persuade a consumer to patronize their store and avoid
searching another store. However, this e¤ect does not occur without bound. My results show that,
eventually, a consumer will be overwhelmed by the number of products o¤ered and search the other
store as well, or possibly, instead. The degree to which consumers are overburdened by the variety
o¤ered di¤ers signicantly across consumers and may not be as prevalent in some as in others. This
nding lends further evidence as to why the choice overload hypothesis has had mixed support.
Future work may benet from also taking into consideration consumers price expectations in
the presence of a preference for variety. Yan and Han (2011) show how consumer price expectations
can also a¤ect the decision to search. However, they assume that consumers do not have a preference
for variety and only a single purchase is made. Price expectations in the presence of a heterogenous
preference for variety may cause consumers to be more, or less, sensitive to the number of products
o¤ered. Future work may also benet by considering collusion among retailers when selecting the
prices and number of products available. My results show that variety is more important than
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prices when deciding whether or not to search. Retailers may, therefore, be able to capitalize on this
information by setting higher prices and o¤ering a wider assortment. If retailers know that other
retailers are also o¤ering a large variety, but not too much, then equilibrium prices may rise since
consumers are less likely to search.
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CHAPTER 5.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
In this dissertation I provide a better understanding of search behavior in the presence of het-
erogenous preferences for variety. By allowing for the observation that consumers purchase multiple
products at each purchase occasion, I consider how a very general denition of variety is related to
search behavior. There are several reasons that consumers purchase multiple products in a single
shopping occasion. The most relevant to search behavior is a consumers preference for variety. In
particular, when a consumer is assumed to purchase a single product, the entire cost of search must
be absorbed by the single product purchase. In contrast, as a consumers preference for variety
increases so does the perceived benet of search because nding several products that are all equally
appealing provides a higher total utility as a result of the diminishing marginal utility of each indi-
vidual product. Allowing for several product purchases, therefore, not only spreads the total cost
of search over several product purchases, but also fundamentally changes the optimal number of
products searched which is driven by the consumers preference for variety, as well as their cost of
search.
Consistent with prior consumer search studies, I nd search behavior plays an important
role in shaping consumer demand, and that preference for variety has important implications for
search behavior. In particular, consumers tend to choose consideration sets with a larger number
of products when they have a strong preference for variety, and smaller choice sets when preference
for variety is weak. Understanding a consumer populations preference for variety in general, and
for particular product categories, has important implications for a retailers decision regarding as-
sortment depth. Knowing which products are in a majority of consumersconsideration sets helps
retailers plan assortment depth and promotion planning. For example, if there are a particular set of
products almost all consumers consider then these products are likely to be key category sales drivers
and eliminating them from the shelf could have detrimental e¤ects on category sales. Understanding
consumer search also helps manufacturers when designing and introducing new products. In partic-
ular, understanding which products a consumer seriously considers helps guide manufacturersnew
product design strategies by identifying niche consumer groups that are focused on a small subset
of products with very specic characteristics. Knowing which products are seriously considered by
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which consumers before a purchase is made informs a critical understanding regarding the specic
elements of a product category di¤erent consumer groups nd particularly appealing.
I investigate the relationship between consumer search and multi-product purchases using a
non-linear additive utility function analogous to Kim, Allenby, and Rossi (2002) and Bhat (2005).
This allows me to develop an analytical consumer demand model in Chapter 2 that endogenizes both
the consideration set and the products chosen. In this model, a consumers decision is described in
a utility maximizing framework that provides a closed form expression for the expected maximum
utility from searching each consideration set. The analytical model illustrates that the gains from
searching a larger consideration set can outweigh the higher cost of doing so when the consumer
has a strong preference for variety. Intuitively, consumers in this case are more likely to nd several
products that meet their needs at a reasonable price, and can purchase some of all of them. Because
the consumer is not restricted to purchasing a unit increment of a single item, their cost of search is
spread over the total quantities purchased of several di¤erent products. This, in turn, allows a higher
search cost to be easily o¤-set by the gains from search. On the other hand, when an individual has
a lower preference for variety, they are more apt to purchase fewer unique brands and so the gains
from a wider search are not similarly o¤set. My ndings suggest that traditional search models tend
to underpredict the number of goods that are searched if there is a strong preference for variety.
I estimate a structural model of consumer search based on this conceptual approach. With this
model, I investigate how heterogenous preferences for variety a¤ect choice. My approach provides
a step forward in the analysis of consumer search behavior because it derives the optimal search
decision using a more general framework than the standard discrete choice demand model. Consistent
with existing studies, I nd households incur a signicant search cost to obtain product information.
This chapter nds that a linear utility model is not exible enough to accurately identify search,
and subsequent purchase behavior, in situations where consumers exhibit a preference for variety.
Consistent with Roberts and Lattin (1991) I nd that search costs are important to account for in
a frequently purchased household item, ice cream. Moreover, a Monte Carlo simulation experiment
provides evidence that assuming every product is considered provides biased parameter estimates.
Therefore, demand estimates that ignore the cost of search results in biased parameter estimates that
can lead to incorrect managerial conclusions even for consumer goods that are regularly purchased
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like ice cream. Moreover, ignoring consumerspreference for variety in shaping the products taken
into consideration can also lead to biased parameter estimates and erroneous managerial conclusion
because the size of the consideration set is likely to be underrepresented. It is critically important
then, to recognize the cost of acquiring information and preference for variety in shaping consumer
demand.
Secondary data, however, always has limitations in the empirical analysis of search behav-
ior, because search costs are not observed. To investigate the relationship between multi-product
purchase environments and search more closely, I develop an experimental test of the relationship
between search costs, variety, and purchase behavior. Using a two-sided experiment, my results
show that retailers can use variety as a competitive tool to retain and attract consumers. However,
the number products o¤ered cannot increase without bound, as consumers have optimal levels of
variety too much choice can be overwhelming.
Taken together, my ndings have several important implications for future research in this
area, and for managers. First, discrete choice models are not su¢ ciently general to represent con-
sumer search behavior in all contexts. Much of the understanding of search behavior has been built
upon the logit model. While the logit, and other, linear utility models provide a number of appealing
characteristics from a analytical point of view, new methods are needed to fully understand con-
sumer search. Numerous situations exist in which the assumptions of classic discrete choice models
fail, and research needs to recognize, and expand into, these areas. Focusing so much attention on
search behavior from the perspective of a discrete choice model has limited our full understanding of
consumer search. The rst two Chapters of this dissertation are a rst step to investigating search
from a more general perspective. In particular I show that a consumers search strategy is driven
not only by the cost of search, but also their preference for variety. As the rate of diminishing
marginal utility increases, or preference for variety increases, consumers increase the size of their
consideration set because the gains from search increase.
Second, I show that there is a wide range of internal and external factors that a¤ect a
consumers decision to search more, or to stop searching and purchase. One particularly important
external factor is the number of products a rm o¤ers. My results support the conclusion that
retailing is a means of reducing consumer search costs and retailers can attract consumers to their
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store with the number of products o¤ered. However, the number of unique choices demanded
by consumers does not increase without bound. Instead, consumers have an optimal number of
products they would like to have available to them. Providing consumers with a huge array of
products increases a consumers search cost because so many alternatives will have to be considered
before nding the ones that provides the best t with the consumers wants. Understanding the
number of products consumers want, and which in particular to provide is an important consideration
for retailers and the structural model developed in Chapter 3 provides a tool for answering those
questions by estimating the consideration set and the satisfaction individual products provide. This
will help category and brand managers better manage their UPC o¤erings which will reduce costs,
and increase consumer welfare through the form of more perfectly aligned product o¤erings and
wants.
The choice overload hypothesis suggests that consumers become overwhelmed by too many
choices and prefer a smaller choice set. Kuksov and Villas-Boas (2010) show how the choice overload
hypothesis can be explained by consumer search costs and that consumers have a nite optimal
variety to search. My experimental results support Kuksov and Villas-Boas (2010) and show that
search increases with the number of products o¤ered, but only to a point. Once there are too many
options, search begins to decrease. This provides a deeper understanding of demand for variety and
shows that consumer welfare does not increase innitely with the number of products available.
My ndings generalize to products and services beyond the consumer goods considered here.
For example, my results suggest that individuals newly purchasing healthcare insurance may be
better o¤ with a limited number of options. Presenting every insurance package may indeed lead to
poor choices, or no decisions at all. Further, the optimal number of insurance packages a consumer
wants available to them will increase with their preference for variety. In other words, even though
consumers are likely to only purchase a single insurance option after searching, the optimal number
they will search through depends on their preference for variety. Given the importance of search to
the success of the new health care legislation, understanding the relationship between search and
preference for variety is critical, and this dissertation provides us with that information. By applying
the models developed here to insurance search and purchase data that is readily available from online
insurance websites such as eHealthInsurance.com, individual consumer characteristics can be used
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to determine which population segments prefer more or fewer insurance plans. Insurance, however,
is typically purchased one policy at a time. In other cases, perhaps hotels for an extended vacation,
or airline ights to get there, the multiple-purchase search model developed here may have similar
implications.
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CHAPTER A
UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
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The constrained maximum utility problem described in equation (2.4) above for the more
general case when attributes and prices are observed is summarized as:
max
KX
i=1
ei (qi + i)

sub. to ~y  
KX
i=1
piqi = 0
qi  0:
The Lagrangian is given by:
L =  
X
i2I
ei (qi + i)

+ 
 
~y  
KX
i=1
piqi
!
  |q (A.1)
where  = f1; :::; Kg|; q = fq1 ; :::; qKg|. Then the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for
the above problem are (Chong and ·Zak 2001 pg. 398):
i  0; 8i;
ei (qi + i)
 1   pi = i; 8i;
KX
i=1
iq

i = 0;
~y  
KX
i=1
piq

i = 0
qi  0 8i:
If I dene L = f @U@q1   p1; :::;
@U
@qK
  pKg| and 0 is a vector of 0s, the above KKT conditions in
matrix notation are:
  0;
L = ;
q| = 0;
~y   p|q = 0;
q  0:
Eliminating  the KKT conditions become:
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L  0;
q|L = 0;
~y   p|q = 0;
q  0:
Or:
ei (qi + i)
 1   pi  0; (A.2a)
KX
i=1
qi

ei (qi + i)
 1   pi

= 0; (A.2b)
~y  
KX
i=1
piq

i = 0; (A.2c)
qi  0 (A.2d)
for all i goods. Notice that the budget constraint is satised for all K goods and is not restricted over
only those purchased goods. Let me partition the set of searched goods K into a set of purchased
goods I and non purchased goods F such that I \ F = ? and I [ F = K. Now, considering the
equations (A.2a) and (A.2b) above. Equation (A.2b) is satised when, and only when, the marginal
utility given in equation (A.2a) is 0 and qi > 0 or, less than 0 and q

i > 0. Therefore, all the
purchased goods, I, satisfy equation (A.2a) with equality and all the non-purchased goods F satisfy
the equation with strict inequality. In other words, the KKT conditions given in equation (2.15) can
be summarized as the price normalized marginal utility of all the purchased goods is equal to any
other purchased good, and is greater than all non-purchased goods.
Given the equality for the purchased goods in I I solve for the analytical solution to the ith
good using the ratio of Li and Lj and the budget constraint given in equation (A.2c). Namely, I
nd:
ei (qi + i)
 1
ej
 
qj + j
 1 = pipj )
qi =

piej
pjei
( 1) 1  
qj + j
  i: (A.3)
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Substituting equation (A.3) into the budget constraint, and indexing the products in I sequentially
to avoid cumbersome set notation, and letting $ = (  1) 1 the budget constraint can be written
as:
~y = pjq

j +
 
qj + j
 IX
k 6=j
pk

piej
pjek
$
 
IX
k 6=j
pkk )
qj =
~y +
PI
k 6=j pkk   j
PI
k 6=j pk

pk exp[j ]
pj exp[k]
$
pj +
PI
k 6=j pk

pk exp[j ]
pj exp[k]
$
=
~y +
PI
k=1 pkk   pjj   j
PI
k=1 pk

pk exp[j ]
pj exp[k]
$
+ jpj

pk exp[j ]
pj exp[k]
$

pj +
PI
k=1 pk

pk exp[j ]
pj exp[k]
$
  pj

pk exp[j ]
pj exp[k]
$
=
~y +
PI
k=1 pkk   pjj + jpjPI
k=1 pk

pk exp[j ]
pj exp[k]
$   j
PI
k=1 pk

pk exp[j ]
pj exp[k]
$
PI
k=1 pk

pk exp[j ]
pj exp[k]
$
=
~y +
PI
k=1 pkkPI
k=1 pk

pk exp[j ]
pj exp[k]
$   j : (A.4)
From symmetry I have:
qi =
~y +
PI
k=1 pkkPI
k=1 pk

pi exp[k]
pk exp[i]
$   i; 8i 2 I: (A.5)
A key point regarding equation (A.5) above is that it does not hold for goods that are not purchased
(those goods in F) and it is conditional on the set of goods I, or more to the point, their parameters.
Since the products to be purchased and their quantities are determined simultaneously this posses
a bit of a combinatorial problem, and suggests that continuous versions of multi-product purchase
models may not hold since those solutions often describe quantity purchases for both purchased
and non-purchased goods. This conditioning makes determining a rms response to the consumers
demand in a competitive setting (i.e. extending it to an equilibrium setting) challenging since the
rm needs to know what other goods were purchased, which is often unobserved. However, even in a
monopolistic setting solving for the rms price response given consumer demand is challenging due
to the proliferation of price in both the numerator and the denominator of qi , and most notably,
inside the ()$ term.
The specic way in which consumers choose the number of product, and quantities thereof,
is described in detail by Pinjari and Bhat (2009). Since their functional form is quite a bit di¤erent
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from that presented here, I will briey describe the process. First, consider the consumers baseline
marginal utility, or the marginal utility when qi = 0 which is e
i 1i . Consumers will choose
products to consider to purchase such that p1 e
1 11      pK eK
 1
K (see Pinjari and Bhat
2009 for the proof). Additionally, when qi = 0 the price normalized marginal utility is less than 
,
or pi e
i 1i < 
. Since the consumer knows all the parameters under consideration except for 
the consumer calculates  for I = 1, say 1; by calculating q

1 . If

p2
e2 12  1 then the consumer
computes the solution to q1 and q

2 to nd 

2. This process continues until

pI+1
eI+1 1I+1 < 

I ; at
which point consumption is set to 0 for the remaining K   I + 1 goods.
Finally, the analytical solution to the marginal utility of income, , that is not product
specic, is found using equation (A.2b) to be:

KX
i=1
qi e
i (qi + i)
 1
= ~y )
 =

~y
KX
i=1
eiqi (q

i + i)
 1
 =

~y
KX
i=1
8<:ei
0@1  iPIk=1 pk

pi exp[k]
pk exp[i]
$
~y +
PI
k=1 pkk
1A0@ ~y +PIk=1 pkkPI
k=1 pk

pi exp[k]
pk exp[i]
$
1A9=;
 =

~y
 
~y +
IX
k=1
pkk
! 1 KX
i=1
8><>:ei

~y +
PI
k=1 pkk   i
PI
k=1 pk

pi exp[k]
pk exp[i]
$
PI
k=1 pk

pi exp[k]
pk exp[i]
$
9>=>; :
The solutions to the quantity purchased do in fact provide a maximum to the utility function,
maxU . To see this, considering the FOCs that provide the solution to qi give in equation (2.15)
above, and dene:
Lij = @Li
@qj
=   (1  ) ei (qi + i) 2 if i = j and 0 otherwise;
Li = @Li
@
=  pi:
The su¢ cient second-order condition for the constrained maximization problem noted in equation
(3.3), once prices and attributes are revealed and uncertainty extinguished, is that the bordered
Hessian be negative denite. Let A denote the bordered Hessian matrix, or:
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A =
0BBBBBBBB@
L11    L1K L1
...
. . .
...
...
LK1    LKK LK
L1    LK L
1CCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
L11 0    0  p1
0 L22    0  p2
...
...
. . .
...
...
0    0 LKK  pK
 p1  p2     pK 0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
Let the ith principal minor of A be denoted as Ai, then:
A1 = L11 < 0, A2 =

L11 0
0 L22
 = L11L22 > 0   
D = jAj =

L11 0    0  p1
0 L22    0  p2
...
...
. . .
...
...
0    0 LKK  pK
 p1  p2     pK 0

(A.6)
=  
KX
j=1
(pj)
2
Ljj
KY
i=1
Lii
=
KX
j=1
(pj)
2
  (1  ) ej  qj + j 2
KY
i=1
  (1  ) ei (qi + i) 2
= ( 1)K ( (1  ))K 1
0@ KX
j=1
(pj)
2
ej
 
qj + j
 2
1A KY
i=1
ei (qi + i)
 2
!
:
Therefore, the bordered Hessian matrix is indeed negative denite and the solutions for all qi
represent the maximum of the utility function since the determinant of A is negative if K is odd
and is positive if K is even as required.
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Next, I consider how the maximum utility in equation (2.8) changes with changes in the
parameters. To simplify notation I use the following abbreviations:
$ = (  1) 1 (A.7a)
j =
IX
k=1
pk

pkej
pjek
( 1) 1
(A.7b)
p =
IX
k=1
pkk: (A.7c)
The following need to be updated based on the observation that utility is summed over all K goods.
However, the qualitative results will not change. I nd:
@maxU
@i
=
pi
~y +
PI
k=1 pkk
(maxU) ; (A.8)
@maxU
@
=
1
(  1)2 (A.9)

IX
i=1
8><>:e
i
i

~y + p
i
0B@ (  1)2i ln
h
~y+p
i
i
+
PI
k=1

pk

pie
k
pkei
(1 ) 1
ln
h
pie
k
pkei
i
1CA
9>=>; ;
@maxU
@i
=   1
(1  ) (A.10)

 
pi
IX
k=1
(
ek
k

piek
pkei
(1 ) 1 
~y + p
i
)
 

~y + p
i
!
:
Notice that @maxU@i < 0 which is expected since i represents the di¤erence between the consumers
ideal product attribute prole and the actual attributes of the product. So, as i gets smaller and
approaches 0, the consumer would be more inclined to purchase that product because it is exactly
what the consumer is looking for in terms of attributes. Therefore, I expect that a smaller i would
lead a higher maximum utility value.
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CHAPTER B
DERIVATION OF EXPECTED MAXIMUM UTILITY
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Because I have the term
PI
k=1 e
 "k
 
in the integral I cannot solve this as the product of
each integral. Instead, I have to solve the inner most integral for "1 then use that solution and solve
the integral for "2, and so on. Looking at the inner most integral
R1
 1   
R1
 1
nR1
 1Fd"1
o
d"2   d"I
I therefore, have:1
8<:
Z 1
 1
 
IX
k=1
e "k
! 
exp
24 IX
j=1
 "j
35 exp"  IX
i=1
e "i
#
d"1
9=; (B.1)
=
IY
j=2
e "j
IY
j=2
e e
 "j
Z 1
 1
e "1e e
 "1
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k=1
e "k
! 
d"1:
Let u =e "1 so  du =e "1d"1 and dene Zr =
PI
k=re
 "k to nd:Z 1
 1
e e
 "1
 
IX
k=1
e "k
! 
e "1d"1 (B.2a)
=  
Z 0
1
e u

u+ Z2
 
du
=
Z 1
0
e u

u+ Z2
 
du (B.2b)
=  e Z2 
h
1  ; u+ Z2
i 
u=1
u=0
= e
Z2 
h
1  ; Z2
i
; if Z2 > 0, or I > 1; (B.2c)
where the expression   [a; z] represents the upper incomplete Gamma function dened as:
  [a; z] =
Z 1
z
ta 1e tdt: (B.3)
The integral of the rst term therefore, becomes:
IY
j=2
e "j
IY
j=2
e e
 "j
Z 1
 1
e "1e e
 "1
 
IX
k=1
e "k
! 
d"1
=
IY
j=2
e "j
IY
j=2
e e
 "j
e
Z2 
h
1  ; Z2
i
=
IY
j=2
e "j
IY
j=2
e e
 "j
IY
j=2
ee
 "j
 
h
1  ; Z2
i
=
IY
j=2
e "j 
h
1  ; Z2
i
; if I > 1. (B.4)
1 Note that the actual order of integration, d"1d"2   d"K , is inconsequential since the probability
space is continuous everywhere in its domain.
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I stop here, momentarily, to look at the expected utility the consumer obtains from searching a
single product i as:
E[maxU1] =
Z 1
 1
U1f("i)d"i (B.5a)
= (A1)

Z 1
 1
 
e "i
 
e "ie e
 "id"i
= (A1)

Z 1
0
e uu du
=   (A1)   [1  ; u]

u=1
u=0
= (A1)

  [1  ]
=

y
p
+

i  
ci
p

  [1  ] : (B.5b)
where   [x] represents the Gamma function. Therefore, as  moves from 0 to 1 the expression
  [1  ] goes from 0 to 1. In the event that the expected utility of searching a single product
outweighed the expected utility of searching multiple products the consumer would select the specic
product i such that
n
i   cip
o

n
j   cjp
o
8j 6= i. Notice that the larger the consumers price
expectation is, the less they would be concerned about the cost of search ci. Turning our attention
back to the case when I > 2 I investigate the expected utility more generally. From equation (3.9a)
and (B.4) I have:
E[maxUK] = (AK)

I
Z 1
 1
  
Z 1
 1
IY
j=2
e "j 
h
1  ; Z2
i
d"2d"3   d"I (B.6)
The inner most integral
R1
 1   
R1
 1
nR1
 1Fd"2
o
d"3   d"I is:
116
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h
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i
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h
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h
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
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h
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; Z3
i
  Z3 
h
1  ; Z3
i
; if I > 2 (B.7b)
=   [2  ] ; if I = 2 or Z3 = 0: (B.7c)
Notice that while the expected utility is solved with respect to product 1 and then 2 this is merely
for convenience. So, the second term in the expected utility function that involves the multiple
integrals is independent of the rst two products chosen and the number of products, or integrals,
in the expectation is what matters. In the event that the consumer selects I = 2 products I nd
that  plays a very small role with respect to the second term in the expectation   [2  ]. As 
goes from 0 to 1 the expression   [2  ] goes from 1 does to a minimum of approximately 0:886 at
  0:538 and then back up to 1. If I > 2 then the second integration term in the expectation is
given by equations (3.9a) and (B.7b). However, to simplify notation dene:
 rx =  
h
x  ; Zr
i
; where x; r 2 Z (B.8)
The second terms in the expectation becomes:
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=

1
2

  [3  ] ; if I = 3: (B.9c)
In general, the term
 
1
2

  [3  ] goes from 1 to 1=2 as  goes from 0 to 1. Next, using equations
(3.9a) and (B.9b) I nd:
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1
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
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] ; if I = 4: (B.9f)
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In general, the term
 
1
3

  [4  ] goes from 2 to 2=3 as  goes from 0 to 1. Next, using equations
(3.9a) and (B.9e) I 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The term
 
1
4

  [5  ] goes from 6 to 3=2 as  goes from 0 to 1. More generally, I nd the Ith
integral, where I  3, is given by:
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:
If I allowed the utility function to be a function of all the searched products, even those that
are not purchased equation (3.7) would become:
maxUK =
IX
i=1
0@

y  PKk=1 ck + pPIk=1 k
p
PI
k=1 ("k)
 1
1A + KX
i=I+1
(i"i)

= U1K + U
2
K:
The E

U1K

is given above and would be unchanged, while the E

U2K

would be:
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Looking at the rst multiple integral in the broken out sum I have:
Z 1
 1
  
Z 1
 1
8<:
Z 1
 1
I+1e
"I+1
KY
j=I+1
e "j
KY
j=I+1
e e
 "j
d"I+1
9=;   d"K )
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I+1
8<:
Z 1
 1
e"I+1
KY
j=I+1
e "j
KY
j=I+1
e e
 "j
d"I+1
9=;
= I+1
KY
j=I+2
e "j
KY
j=I+2
e e
 "j
Z 1
0
e"I+1e "I+1e e
 "I+1d"I+1
= I+1
KY
j=I+2
e "j
KY
j=I+2
e e
 "j
Z 1
0
u e udu
= I+1
KY
j=I+2
e "j
KY
j=I+2
e e
 "j
  [1  ] :
I therefore, have:
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Extending the above derivation to the I   rth integral it is clear that
E
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:
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CHAPTER C
DERIVATION OF THE JACOBIAN MATRIX
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From equation (3.19) the i; h elements of the Jacobian are given by:
J =
@(W1  Wi+1 + "1)
@qh+1
; 8i; h = 1; :::;K
and from equation (3.17c) I have:
Wi = i + ln+ (  1) ln [qi + i]  ln [pi] for i = 1; 2; :::;K: (C.1)
The i; h element of the Jacobian matrix is:
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i+1

)
@qh+1;
=
@((  1) ln

1
p1

~y  PIi=2 piqi+ 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where di = i + ln ()   ln [pi] + "1 and ~y = y  
PK
i=1 ci: The determinant of the Jacobian matrix
becomes:
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(qi + i)
! 1
(C.2)
which is the same as Bhat (2005) except i = .
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CHAPTER D
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTERED WITH THE EXPERIMENT
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Please take your time and answer all the questions as accurately as possible. If you have any
questions, please do not hesitate to ask.
 What is your current age?
 Are you male or female?
 Male
 Female
 How many people live in your household? Include yourself, your spouse and any dependents.
Do not include your parents or roommates unless you claim them as dependents.
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8+
 Please indicate the category below that describes the total amount of INCOME earned last
year by the people in your household.
 Under $5000
 $5000-$7999
 $8000-$9999
 $10,000-$11,999
 $12,000-$14,999
 $15,000-$19,999
 $20,000-$24,999
 $25,000-$29,999
 $30,000-$34,999
 $35,000-$39,999
 $40,000-$44,999
 $45,000-$49,999
 $50,000-$59,999
 $60,000-$69,999
 $70,000-$99,999
 $100,000 - $124,999
 $125,000 - $149,999
 $150,000 - $199,999
 $200,000 +
 What is the highest level of education you attained?
 Some High School
 High School / GED
 Some college
 Associates degree
 Bachelors degree
 Masters degree
 Some Doctorate education
 PhD or MD
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 Do you have, or will you obtain, a Bachelors degree, or advanced degree in any of the following
areas: - Business Administration (or a major related to business - marketing, accounting, etc.)
- Economics - Mathematics - Statistics - Engineering - Physics - Computer Programming?
 Yes
 No
 Have you ever, or do you currently, work at a job whose duties involves handling the accounts
receivable or accounts payable? In other words, have you ever, or do you currently, work at a
job in which you handle some or all of the nancial aspects of the company?
 Yes
 No
 Please choose the category below that describes the total amount of money your household
spends on groceries in an average month.
 $0 - $100
 $101 - $200
 $201 - $300
 $301 - $400
 $401 - $500
 $501 - $600
 $601 - $700
 $700 +
 I dont know
 When doing day to day grocery shopping, which of the following selections is most likely
accurate?
 I shop around at multiple stores to obtain the best price on di¤erent products.
 I check store coupons and advertisements and shop at the grocery store that o¤ers the
best deal on the products I plan to purchase.
 I check the prices of the products I plan to purchase online and go to the grocery store
that makes my total purchase the cheapest.
 I shop at the grocery store that is most convenient.
 Which of the following attributes is more important when making a grocery store selection?
 Price
 Product selection
 Please rate the following categories in terms of how likely you would be to make a purchase
on-line, rather than at a local retailer.
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Not Unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely
Applicable - I almost 2 6 - I almost
always    always
purchase purchase
this at local this online
retailers - 1 7
Baby products        
Beauty and fragrances        
Books and magazines        
Clothing, accessories,        
and shoes
Gifts and owers        
Health and personal care        
Computers, accessories,        
and services
Education        
Electronics and telecom        
Entertainment        
and media
Food retail and service        
Sports and outdoors        
Toys and hobbies        
Home and garden        
 In general, when you go shopping, which of the following is more accurate in general, not
necessarily for groceries?
 I like to get in, obtain what I was looking for, and leave.
 I like to shop around a bit and see the di¤erent products the retailer carries.
 How often do you make purchases online?
 Never
 Less than Once a Month
 Once a Month
 2-3 Times a Month
 Once a Week
 2-3 Times a Week
 Daily
 How often do you have something delivered to your home that was purchased online?
 Never
 Less than Once a Month
 Once a Month
 2-3 Times a Month
 Once a Week
 2-3 Times a Week
 Daily
 If you were thinking about getting into a new hobby and were going to make a purchase,
where is the rst place you would go for information? For example, if you were going to get
into photography, what is the rst information source you would use to obtain information on
di¤erent cameras?
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 Recommendation of friends
 Online retailers product information
 Online manufacturers product information
 Local retailer
 Other
 What is your Subject ID number?
You have completed the demographic portion of the questionnaire. I will begin the actual
experiment in a moment. Please wait for further instructions.
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